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September 30, 1938, was a day of great rejoicing in Europe. 
It was generally assumed .that this date would go down in history as 
a day on whd..ch reason had prevailed over national ambitions and on 
which a generation of pe~ce had been secured for Europe. Less than 
a year was required to show how illusory those hopes were, but, at 
that time, relief that war had been averted was almost universal 
and good will prevailed. 
Great crowds gathered at the airports of London and Paris to 
welcome home the statesmen who had brought peace to Europe when 
war had seemed certain. Protected from the rainy English skies by 
a large blE1:ck umbrella, Neville Chamberlain, the British Prime 
Minister, proclaimed to the world his hope that the Munich Agreement 
was only a prelude to a larger settlement which would embrace all 
of Europe. Thousands of Londoners cheered wildly as Chamberlain 
made his way to his car and was whisked .off to receive the thanks 
of the King and Queen. 
This triumphal reception was repeated in Paris where the 
French Premier, Edouard Daladier, was mobbed in the most tumultous 
reception Le Bourget airport had seen since Charles Lindberg completed 
his transatlantic fligr:i.t in 1927, As Daladier drove back to his 
office at the Ministry of Defense, a French reporter, following in 
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a newsreel van, caught the emotion of the moment: 
I saw men and women kiss our premier's hand, For he 
had given orders that the two policemen on either side 
should let the crowd do as it liked. Not that he was eager 
for adoration but because at that moment he was being 
adored. He, that is to say a representative of that crowd 
whose irresistible surge was not to be strangled or less-
ened by a policeman's angry interference. 
Next to him [Foreign Minister J Bonnet was weeping. 
And mixed with the cires of "Long live the peace!" and 
"Thank you, Daladier!" there was a "Bravo Bonnet!" every 
other moment, which made him smile through his tears. For 
his part; Daladier did not cry; but his tense smile was 
even more moving ... 
At the crossing of the rue Lafayette and the boulevard 
Haussrnann the thousands of people brought the car to a 
halt. A woman .flung her arms around Daladier's neck and 
kissed him heartily on both checks ... 
The Pont de la Concorde thundered beneath us. A 
blind ex-serviceman waved his white stick, shouting, "Long 
live peace!"l 
Hundreds of flowers were thrown into the Premier's open car as he 
drove through Paris. Daladier thoughtfully had them sent to the 
Tomb of the Unknown Soldier under the Arch of Triumph and appeared 
there himself a few days later with a large wreath to give thanks 
that another costly conflagration had been averted. 
But there was a significant and ominous difference in the 
attitudes of the leaders of the two great Western democracies,· 
Chamberlain, obviously fatigued by the trip and tension, was never-
theless gay and confident. Daladier, on the other hand, appeared 
despondent and displayed noticeably less enthusiasm for the Munich 
Agreement than did the crowds who greeted him in Paris. Although 
Daladier' s public statements tended to bolster confidence in the 
pact, his appearance and his private statements reveal that he 
. had serious doubts about the future peace of Europe. Before land-
ing in Paris, Daladier asked his pilot to circle the field so that 
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he could regain his composure and prepare some soothing words for 
what he expected to be a hostile crowd. When he was cheered for 
bringing peace instead of booed for aban:loning France's most impor-
tant ally in the East, the French Premier remarked to an aide, "The 
:l.mbeciles--if they only. know what they were acclaiming! 112 Later, 
when he placed the wre~th at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, 
Daladier ~ppeared "tired and worn" amidst the public rejoicing. 3 
On October 3, Daladier told the American Ambassador in Paris, 
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William Bullitt, that within six months he expected France and Great 
Britain to be faced with new Germa.n demands, possibly in the colonial 
field, and probably also with Italian demands suppofted by Germany 
for Tunis and Syria. 4 
The French Premier obviously did not share Chamberlain's opti-
mism and re;cognized .from its inception that the Munich Agreement was 
a mistake. In fact., Daladier had warned Chamberlain only ten days 
before the Munich Conference that Hitler inten:ied to destroy 
Czechoslovakia, build hegemony in the East and then turn on the West.5 
The question thus arises of why Da.ladd.er acquiesced at Munich when 
he understood so clearly the consequences of his action. The moti-
vations of the British Prime Minister were simple and straightfor-
ward: Chamberlain, although he had some doubts as to how long the 
Agreement would last, sincerely believed that he had achieved an 
equitable settlement of the Sudeten problem and hoped that in appeas-
ing Hitler he had opened the door to a generation of peace for 
Europe. 6 Daladier, however, had no such illusionq and the questions 
of why he signed.the Munich Agreement and what he hoped to gain 
are therefore more complex and more puzzling than Chamberlain's 
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motivations. This study is an attempt to gain insight into Daladier's 
motivations through an examination of his life and character and 
his actions before, during .and after the Munich Conference. 
To date, most historians who have dealt with the Conference 
have not extensively discussed the role of the French Premier. 
Daladier is usually ignored as a secondary figure in the proceedings 
or is treated relatively simplistically. Many historians assume 
that Daladier. did not have the strength of will to stan::1 up to 
Hitler, and rp:e .. · is most frequently characterized as "weak." This 
•.1,' 
interpretation takes its most extreme form in the writings of 
Andre Geraud. GJraud, who wrote with great bitterness while his 
country was occupied by Germany, describes Daladier as a "patriot 
without strength of will," a spineless man with no will power. 7 To 
Geraud, Daladier was a weak and irresolute man who achieved success 
as a politician·by jumping from one popular cause to another, but 
was a failure as a statesman because he hated to be forced into 
.,. 
making a decision. Geraud ruthlessly castigates everyone involved 
with the French defeat in 1940 with no apparent attempt at objectiv-
ity, and it is consequently difficult to take seriously his gener~ 
alized an::1 highly emotional interpretation. Nevertheless, his 
charge of weakness has been echoed by more objective an::1 scholarly 
writers such as John 1t!heeler-Bennett. 
Wheeler-Bennett presents Daladier as a weak man who understood 
what would happen if France and Britain gave in to Hitler, but 
who vacillated between the conflicting views of the men in his 
cabinet. The French Premier is credited with the intellectual 
integrity which enabled him to perceive the.situation clearly, but 
Wheeler .... Bennett faults him for failing .to take energetic action to 
rectify the. proolerns he·saw because of his dislike of the disagree-
able: 
For; the·. tragedy of Edouard. Dalad_ier is that when he. became 
aware of the evils which surrounded him he had· not · the · 
strength of·character to apply.the drastic measures neces-
sary to remove them. He preferTed . to shift the onus of. 
responsibi8ity elt3ewhere rather than to purge his·. 
entourage. 
He attributes Daladier '.s eff<Jrts t0 restrain British concessions 
to Hitler prior to Municp to the arguments.of the resistance group 
in·the. French cabinet and says that when the French Premier finally 
gp..ve in he salved his conscience by SUI,'I'endering to Chamberlain 
rather than directly to Hitler. Wheeler-Bennett paints a tragic 
portrait of Daladier at Municn as I:Jerhaps the only person there 
besides Hitler who.was aware of the catastrophic consequences of 
the Agreement, . but who did not · have the strength of will to plunge 
his c0untry into war. 
This interpretation seerps quite plausible.at fir:'st since it 
neatly explains .both why Daladier signed the ~unich Agreement.and 
why he appeared so d~spairing. about doing it., However,. there are 
certain iniications that Daladier's motiyations were not so simple 
as the.phase "lack of strength of·will" implies. For example, when 
Daladier took office in April, 1938, he was generally regarded as 
a strong man, as possibly ·the, only man. in France with ,the strength 
to restore order and pull the country out of the chasm of chaos 
into which it a19peared to be falling. 9 ·.Within.a few days, Dala<:lier. 
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had· settled the· wides:tciread strikes which were cripplir.i.g the. country's · 
aircraft in:iustry. Tne mere fact that Daladier held office for two 
6 
years., from April., 1938 to March., 1940., as compared to the inter-
war .average of six months ·for premiers of the Third Republic 
indicates. that -he was a man of no ordinary mettle, These consid-
erations do not necessarily protect Daladier. from a charge,of 
weakness at Munich., but they do indicate that there must· have been 
severely extenuating circumstances which caused him to sign the 
Muni.ch Agreement against his better judgrrient. If it was .not 
personal weakness, . what ·. then could have prompted Dala<iier to agree 
to the Munich settlement? 
Andrew Rothstein sees an answer in.ulteri0r motives whicQ, 
although implausible, deserve consideration. Rothstein asserts that 
Chamberlain and Daladier conspired to encourage Nazi· expansicm 
eastward· to provoke a cenflict between Germany and the Soviet Union. 
Lacking put;ilic statemen:~s to the effect., Rot_hstein uses quotations 
from private conversations to show that there was a strong fear 
among French and British leaders that the only victor of a Franco-
German conflict would be the Soviet Union. Because of their morbid 
fear of Camnunism, says Rothstein., Chamt>erlain and Daladier sacri-
ficed Czechoslovakia.hoping that Hitler's "March to the East" would 
eventually result in a conflict with the Soviet Union in which the 
two countries would kill each other off and thus eni the threats 
from both C0Il'lITlUnism and Nazism. Rothstein uses the analogy of .two 
outwardly respectable businessmen (Chamberlain and Daladier) who 
buy off two gangsters (Hitler and Mussolini) to keep the gangsters 
pointed in the other direction while their own businesses remain 
10 safe. 'Ihe strongest argument in Rothstein's ·book is ·that since 
Stalin feared a clash with Hitler., surely Champerlain and Daladier 
must have been hoping for the same thing. 
lliis argument not only lacks logic but also fails to account 
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for Da.ladier's dejected appearance at Munich. Surely the French 
Premier would have been more cheerful if. he thought he .had just 
successfully initiated a clash between his two most feared enemies. 
While Rothstein does succef;(i in sh01'Jing that Dalq.dier and Chamberlain 
were cencerned,and fe~ful about the role of the Soviet Union in, 
European politics.,. he fails to prove that this concern was the · 
primary motivation for the Munich Agreement. 
More recent studies tend to be . more. sympathetic toward Daladier 
and empha,size the pressures on him at Munich. For example, Gi1:bert 
Fergusson., in an article comparing the French and Br'itish roles 
at Munich, describes Daladier as the most unn,appy person at.Munich 
because he was extremely conscious of his moral failure in abandon-
ing Czechoslovakia.11 While Ferguson raises·more questions about 
Daladier's motivations thar;i. he answers, he points to the poor condi-
tion of the French Air_ Force and the Sact that neither France nor 
Great Britain had a great deal of confidence in each other as 
factors which weighed heavily on Daladier's mind at Ml.lnich, implying 
that·it was the weakness of the Frel).ch military and diplomatic 
positions at the time rather. than personal· weaknes·s which caused him to 
sign the Munich Agreement. 
A similar positon :is taken in a more lengthy study by Albert . 
Gay Jr. who finds that Daldier can be partially vindicated of his 
actions at Munich by French· internal divisiveness, military unpr_e-
paredness and Br'itish intransigence. 12 While Gay notes that no one 
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today would refer to Daladier as the strong man he was known.as in 
the mid-1930's, he also points out that few today accept Geraud's 
interpretation of the "patriot without strength of will." How then 
are we to understand this man who loved his country so much and yet. 
failed to avert the war which he knew would be a horrible catastrophe 
for all of Europe? This study of Daladier's life and character, of· 
the events which led to the Munich Conference and of Daladier's 
reactions to Munich will show brilliant flashes of strength and 
understanding but al.so discouraging lapses. Daladier emerges as a 
relatively strong man among the politicians of the.Third Republic, 
yet as a man who was not strong enough to conquer the tide of the 
times. It nay seem a mere semantic difference to say that Daladier 
was not weak, he simply was not strong enough, but today it seems 
a much more accurate and understanding way to describe this man 
who tried so hard to do the best for France. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE MAN AND ~TIMES 
E.d.ouard. Bal<;1.Elier was .b0rn in Jur:le, 1B84, in Carpentras, a town 
near th_e Rhone River in ·the Province of Vaucluse .. His father ·was 
a baker, a man,of the lower middle class and of mildly ,left-wing 
political persuasion~ . Edouard, , however, displayed academic inclina-
tions, forso0k hi~ father's vocational footsteps and pursued his 
educatien by successfully .competing for scholarships. At the Lycee 
of Ly0ns, Daladier studied under Edouard Herriot who would later 
become his political mentor and then rival. Daladier received 
the diploma of Etudes Superieurs with. the citation of ''Very Good" 
after answering his examinatien question on the administrati0n of 
a large abbey,in Carolingian times according to ancient decuments. 
In.1909, Daladier. toek the difficult state competive examination, 
the Aggr>egation of History and Geography, and received the highest 
score, anl achievement which ent.itled him to a year's study abroad 
and marked him. as a man who would some day be an excellent professor o 
,. N'/\. Daladier first taught a year at the Lycee of :i.mes, and then spent 
his year abroad in Rome studying the nineteenth-century revolu-
tionary movement which led to Italian unification. On returning to 
France, Daladier, taught briefly at .the Lycee ef Grenoble and then, 
turning t0 I,)qlitics, was elected mayor of Carpentras in May, 1912. 
As .a public official, Daladier paid attention to 'foreign as well 
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as local affairs and expressed concern over the level of German 
armaments and the Balkan situation. 1 
When war came in 1914, Daladier was mobilized and served as a 
sergeant in the Se~ond RegiPlent of the Foreign Legion in Champagne 
and Arras. After·an offensive near Souchey·in.1915, Daladier's 
battalion was so decimated that it was disbanded and the sury;tvors 
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redistributed. Sergeant Daladier was assigned to the 209th Infantry 
Regiment, which participated in the September, 1915, offensive in 
Souain. Next, the 209th was sent to Verdun where the unit was cited 
for excellent organizational and defensive work. in the sector of 
Avocourt, the hinge of the Verdun position. Daladier was personally 
rewarded in April of 1916 with a promotion to lieutenant. His 
citation read in part, "In the fighting in which he has taken part 
as a sergeant and as leader of a section, notably at Arras and the 
redoubt.of Avocourt, has given proof of coolness, energy and a great 
. 2 . 
deal of bravery." In May, 1917, he was again cited·for bravery 
and awarded the Legion of Honor. Daladier's regiment participated 
in the last great offensives of the war and was the first to cross 
the Sorrme River. 
Undoubtedly Daladier's experiences in the war had a great 
impact on his character. The carnage of the war, which marzy 
commentators attributed to the then dominant "doctrine of offense," 
produced strong reactions throughout France, and.many Frenchmen 
became strongly pacifistic for the next two decades. Daladier him-
self shared the general hatred and horror of warfare, but believed 
that the best way to avoid war or conduct an unavoidable war was 
through the "doctrine of defense," as expounded by Generals 
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Henri Petain, Maxime Weygand and Maurice Gamelin. This·theory held 
that modern technology made it possible to construct impregnable 
defensive fortifications and that the most efficient means of con-
ducting warfare was from such defensive positions. This idea was 
so firmly ingrained in French thinking that France spent billions 
of francs constructing the Maginot Line of fortifications facing 
Germany. In.fact, adherence to this doctrine was a major reason 
why France was not prepared to conduct an.offensive war against 
Germany in support of Czechoslovakia in 1938, and Daladier must 
share the blame as one of the· roo.j or supporters of that theory in the 
interwar .years. Nevertheless, it should be noted that, in propound-
ing the doctrine of defense, DAladier was following the thinking 
of most French military leaders and of most of public opinion as 
well. Having fought in some of the worst battles of the .Great War, 
Daladier was determined that France should never undergo another sucn 
ordeal if it could reasonably be· avoided. Hise abhorrence of warfare, 
however, did not lead to the "peac~ at any price" attitude which 
characterized some French leaders in 1938, 
After the war, Daladier married Mlle. Madeleine Laffone, the 
daughter of a Paris doctor, and returned to Carpentras, where he 
was elected to the French Chamber of Deputies as a member of the 
Radical Socialist party. The Radical Socialists, commonly referred 
to as the Radicals, were far more moderate than their name implies, 
occupying a positon only slightly left of center in the French 
political spectrum. In general terms, the party stood for: 
Minimal regulation by the government, opposition to strong 
trade unions and apprehension concerning the giant companies, 
belief in equal opportunities for achievement an:i hence an 
opposition to entrenched, traditional groups such as the 
clergy and the aristocracy,3 
The party had its greatest strength in rural, provincial France 
representing the .lower middle class, but ;including some liberal 
professions an:i farmers as well. Because of its central position 
in French po+itics, the Radical party tended to act as a balancer 
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party, never in power by itself but always allied with groups to the 
right or left to forin the ruling coalition. 4 Thus as a member of 
the Radical par~y, Daladier was in the mainstream of the French 
politics. 
In th.e Chamber, Daladier seldom spoke, but. when he did, he 
r::: 
defended his statements with great stubbornness and tenacity.~· 
Although he habitually wore. a frown, Daladier had a straightforward 
and unpretentious personality which combined with his unquestionable 
honesty and loyalty to his · friends to win him many supporters among 
party workers, Daladier assiduously cultivated the legend of the 
strong, silent man. In 1928, he told the residents of Orange in 
his native Vaucluse: 
I wish to recall once again the life of William of Orange, 
wrongly known as the "the Silent," when he should have been 
c.alled "the Reticent." He spoke only of .what he knew well, 
and thus did not encounter the inconsistencies to which. 
facile popularities lead. He had an intense interior life, 
the only res.ource that enables ong to dominate the anger 
of men and the caprice .of events. 
Without a doubt, Daladier was describing himself as well, or at 
least the model he was trying to emulate. Many French leaders did 
take Daladier's silence for strength, an:i he rose quickly in the 
party hier:3.rchy. 
Daladier hald his first cabinet post in 1924 as Minister of 
French Colonies µn:ier Edouard Herriot's Cartel des Gauches. Once· 
astride the spinning carrousel. of French cabinet .posts, Daladier 
successively held portfolios of War, Pub.lie Instruction and· Public 
Works. His unquestioned favorite was the Ministry of War. Here 
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Daladier worked to reorganize the anny to conform with the doctr~ne · 
of defense but was greatly hindered by ministerial instability. 
In 1926, the Radical party lead;er, Edouard Herriot, moved to 
the. right to join Raymond Poincare' s conservative .government. 
Daladier preferred to stay with the Cartel des Gauches and led a 
succe~sful intra-party rebellion which cuJminated in his being 
elected president of the party in 1927, Although Herriot and 
Daladier put .on ,a public pretense of amiability, .most of France. 
was aware that they did not get along we).l together and were the 
rival leaders. of the right ·and left wings of the party. 
The_ 1928 nati<;:mal elections reflect.ed public approval of the 
prosperity 'Which Poincare had brought to France, and Daladier spent 
the next four years in oppos:ition. By _1932, however,; the depression 
ha.d produced a reversal of public opinion. The Radicals and the 
Socialists engineered a successful electoral alliance whichworkec:i 
mostly for the benefit of the ·Radical party an:i greatly .increased. 
the· strength .-0f the Left in Parliament.• Altpough the Soc:j.alist 
leader, Leon Blwn, in a surpri~ing break with tradition, offered 
Socialist participation in· a Rq.dical government, the idea was . 
' 
rejected by Herriot. A series of Radica;:l. governments in 1932 failed 
to produce workable parliamentary :maj 0ri:ties, and the task 0f 
governing the ccmntry was, left, substantially undone, as was the 
cust0IT1 of the Third Republic during most of·. the interwar years. 
The financial situation was especially crucial and controversial, 
with the Right insisting .on budgetary deflation to establish a 
sound.fiscal system and the Left demanding increased spending to 
boost the c0µntry out. of the depression. 
15 
In December, 1932, Herriot's government fell ,over the question 
of the repayment of the war debt to the United States, and a ·brief 
government byJoseph Paul-Boncour, another Radical leader, failed 
to improve the sit1.J,ation. On January 29, 1933, the day before 
Adolf Hitler came to power in Germany, Edoua.ro.Daladier was asked, 
to form a government. Although it was :to be primarily a Radical 
government, Daladier initially offered the ·. Socialists five cabinet 
posts · to win their support. The· Socia.lists agreed if Daladier. 
would abi¢ie by· the .spirit of .their reform program, which included 
nationalization of ~urance companies, rai.lways and arms prcxlucti1:m 
and the. establishment of .a forty-hour work week. 7 · However, the 
consummation of this histor:-ic allian.ce was thwarted by the right wing 
of the Radica,J. party which expressed its p.isapproval of Socialist 
participation to Daladier in no uncertain terms. The Soctalists, 
seeing they were not wanted, withdrew their acceptance of Da.ladier's 
offer, although many of them gave support to the Ra~ical government 
which Daladier formed the. next day. 
At least one reputable scholar has maintained that Daladier was. 
not sincere in his offer to the Socialists, but was instead making· 
a supposedly unacceptable offer which, although impossible for the 
Socialists to accept, would se,cure their support .for Daladier' s 
government. 8 Daladier certainly was not in sympathy with most of 
the Socialist reform program,. but, in any event., the result ·was 
the formation of·a Radical government and a split in the ,Socialist 
party over whether or n0t to support Daladier. Even though the. 
Socialist right wing supported Daladier, he could not obtaiin, a 
secure parliamentary maj 0:rity without support of the· entire pa.rj;y. 
Thus Daladier found himself in the.same position as ·many of .his 
predecessors. 
16 
It was predictable :that, without a ~ority in Parliament, 
Daladier would introduce no drastic changes in·government. In fact., 
his administration differed little from those which had ·preceded . 
it, except for its relat:i.:vely long existence of ten months. · 
Daladier's lengthy tenure in office was as much fortuitous as it 
was skillful •. His· political maneuvering to stay in office was . 
aided, by the split in the Socialist. party which prevented.their 
effective opposition, gr>eater unity within the Radical party ani 
restive public opinion which displayed the exasperation of:the 
people at the frequency of governmental crises.9 As· Premier.,10 
Daladier tried to achieve a balance between the Right and the Left 
in France·l;:>y giving something to each side.· Finance was left in.the 
hands . of the right wing of the party., and a policy of budgetary 
deflation., which actually tended to worsen the .economic crisis., was. 
followed. On the other hand., numerous proposals for social reform 
were made to woo the Socialists . In the end., these two ,basic 
policies proved incompatible., although Daladier and other Radical 
leaders did not see them as such. 11 · Daladier 's government was fin-
ally overthrown. on October 23 by a combination of Socialist on the 
left and moderates on the right.. Daladier had -not accomplished a 
17 
great deal for France, but his reputation as a strong man remained 
intact, and the impact of a fresh government scandal soon gave him·. 
another chance to govern the country. 
I 
~- history of .the scandals of the.Third Republic, and it 
would be a long one, must include a chapter on the Stavisky scandal 
of 1934. This scandal not ·only. led to the downfall of two French 
governments; but also produce.d the worst riots in Paris . since the . 
days of the Commune .. Serge Alexandre Stavisky was a confidence 
man.who earned his living by speculating in inflated born. issues and 
remained free of prosecution through his political connections. 
The affair became public on December 28, 1933, and at first seemed 
to be just another of the many financial scandals of the Third 
Republic, except for the fact that Stavisky's political connections 
were widespread and reached into high government positions. In 
fact, th~ man.responsible for postponing Stavisky's trial nineteen 
times over a five year period was the Chief Prosecutor .in Paris 
and the brother-in-law of the current Radical PrerrLter, Camille 
Chautemps. The· situation grew more intense when it was learned that 
two of Chautemps' cabinet mimsters had had-financial dealings 
with Stavisky. 
Then, on January 8, 1934, Stavisky was four:d. dead under 
circumstances which suggested police complicity, perhaps under orders 
from the Minister of the Interior. Stavisky had shot himself try-: 
ing to avoid capture, and the police apparently allowed him to 
bleed to death before summoning help. 12 Public indignation was 
extreme as French newspapers railed against corruptiqn in government 
and public as.sassinations to conceal culpability. A series of 
riots broke out in Paris, and Chautemps only made matters worse 
by trying to censor the press and refusing to appoint a commission 
to investigate the affair. Chautemps was even attacked by merrroers 
of his own party when a group of Radical deputies ·published a 
tract demand,ing the "pitiless punistiment of all misdemeanors" and 
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a cabinet composed of "forceful men above. suspicion, who are resolved 
not simply, :to stay in :office, but to govern as men of ·action. 1113 
At last, on January 28, Chautemps could take no more and submitted 
his resignation. The man who most nearly approximated the. Radical 's 
demand was Edouard·Daladier. He was irreproachably honest with 
no hint of scandal in his public career, and his reputation as a 
strong man presented him as the ideal person to restore order in 
this time of crisis. 
'Recognizing a shift to the right in public opinion, Daladier 
broke with the Cartel des Gaucnes and tried to form a government 
across the political spectrum. In doing so, he neglected his 
own party and alienated many Radical leaders. Thus .when Daladier' s 
coaliti.on proved impossible to construct, he had no political 
foundation to fall back on. 'Ihe predominantly Radical government 
which .he finally put together had no political basis and, therefore, 
h f . l 14 no c ance or survi va . · 
With this fragile basis for action, Daladier launched an 
investigation of the scandal. Learning of tne complicity of Jean 
Chiappe, the.popular right~wing Prefect of Paris Polic~, Daladier 
ordered his dismissal. 'Ihis action touched off a huge demonstration 
by right-wing groups at the Place de la Concorde on Feb~uary 6. 
Inflamed.by the hysterical Parisian press and joined by Corrmunist 
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demonstrat0rs, the mob turned-violent and-clashed with police. 
Firing .broke out as the police tried :to prevent the crowd, estimated 
at 40,000, from storming the Palais-Bourbon where the Chamber . 
of Deputies was in session. For several hours there was a distinct 
possibility that ·the rioters might seize the deputies and overthrow 
the Republic, Although this danger was .narrowly averted, the· 
distruban~e continued far into the night. By the next morning, 
eighteen were dead and large areas of Paris were extensively darna~d. 
The violence upset Daladier considerably. At -first, supported 
by several votes of confidence from the Chamber before it hastily 
adjourned and-fled the Palais-Bourbon, Daladier maintained that he 
would stay in office and protect the security of;the state. The 
next morning, however, he received a stream of-leading political 
.,. 
figures all of whom except Leon Blum urged him to resign to fore-
stall further violence. Faced witz:i. the possibility of renewed 
rioting and-with .the realization that his government had no support, 
Daladier gave in and announc~µ his resignation. 
Some historians have rna.intained that Daladier quit out of 
weakness or fear. 15 He certainly was .afraid that his remaining in 
office would lead to gpeater violence an:i the necessity of declaring 
martial law .to maintain order, but is it weakness to concede an 
untenable position? After the: Second World War, Daladier told the 
cqmmission investigating events in France.leading up to the .conflict 
that remaining at his ·post in 1934 would probably have brought more 
violence. and mQre deaths . "Following many invitations, in the. 
interest of the country, in .the interest of re-estaolishing caJmness 
of spirit; I rendered my.· resignation. 1116 Considering also the lack 
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of political support for his government, Da~ier had little 
ch,oice but to resign. His reputation as a strong man was ta.µzlished; 
and he suffered political eclipse for more than a year, but·the 
riots ended -and order was reestablished. In re.trm~pect, it can 
be saio. that Daldier might have been able to resolve the situation 
and· continue in office, although this theory is by no means · certain. 
The. emphasis in this study, however, is on the fact that · Dalad.ier · 
resigned., not· ~:)Ut of weakness, but. from the honest and logical. 
conviction that leaving office was the best thing he could do for 
France; The fact that ·there were no other "strong men" to take 
Daladier's place and resolve the;crisis ·rather than merely letting 
it pass was certainly dama.g:Lng to France and to the Radical party, 
but this was not the fault of Daladier. 
T.he· French government·s .of 1934 and 1935 which followed that 
of ·Daladier were essentially conservative and their deflationary 
' ' 
fiscal policies greatly aggravated France;' s poor economic situation. 
By ·mid-1935, Daladier realized that a drastic .change was necessary, 
and he emerged as the.leading politician who brought the Radical 
.,. 
party into Leon Blum's Popular Front.. In _April, 1936, the French 
people expressed their discontent by giving a substantial electoral 
victory to the Popular Front cor;nbination of Radicals, Socialists 
and Comnunists. Daladier once more returned to the Ministry ·of 
War to continue his reforms in accordance with the doctrine of 
defense. 
It .was under the Blum government that Dalad.ier made his 
gr>eatest contributions to the defense of France. 17 Following the· 
remilitarization of the Rhineland by an audacious Adolf Hitler in 
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March, 1936, Daladier asked General Maurice Gamelin, Chief of the 
French General Staff, for a comprehensive plan of defensive military 
reorganization of.several years' scope. The result, in September 
of 1936, was a four-year plan calling for the expenditure of fourteen 
million ·francs for rearmament. Daladier saw the program initiated 
and insured that the Chamber never denied the army the necessary 
funds. Furthermore, in June, 1936, Daladier established the legal 
conditions for requisitiorµng defense plants and two months later 
obtained a law authorizing nationalization of the manufacture of 
war materials. By 1937, Daladier was recognized as a stalwart 
defender of the army. Thus while the Popular Front coalition 
gradually degenerated into the Unpopular Front, Daladier maintained 
public acclaim as the strong man of French defense. 
Part of the reason for Daladier's popularity was his espousal 
of the doctrine of defense, then in vogue in France. On February 2, 
1937, Daladier spoke to the Chamber of Deputies in opposition to 
the. concept of the "armee de m~tier," or professional, specialized 
army, then under consideration. 18 It had been proposed that 
specialized offensive forces, such as a tank corps, be added to 
the regular French Army. Daladier opposed this reform for two 
reasons. First, the specialized forces would be difficult to create 
because they would require nearly doubling the size of the stand-
ing army and; by their elite cl:)aracter would destroy the unity of 
the arpi.y. But mor:e importantly, Daladier argued, specialized 
forces were incompatible with the doctrine of defense. Such forces 
might achieve some local success in actual combat, but would even-
tually be dec:imated in conformity with tne great law of warfare that 
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offensives can only be .undertaken after the accumulation of great 
quantities of men an:i material. When these specialized forces were 
destroyed, he asked, what ·then.· would be the fate of the country? 
Daladier warned against placing faith in specialized units and, 
as an example~ pointed to the Fascist attack on Madrid, where en-
trenched firepower had repelled a tank attack and had sustained 
air strikes without weakening. Entrenched firepower was the most 
efficient way to .wage war. Ra~her than specialized forces, 
Daladier greatly favored construction of a defensive umbrella 
which, in case of war, would protect the country and permit the 
mobilization of forces sheltered from enemy attack by land, air 
or sea. He went so far as to propose extension of the Maginot 
Line to cover the entire French frontier from Dunkerque to Switzer-
land. The fortifications then could not be .by-passed and would 
provide a much more durable protection for France than specialized 
offensive .forces could ev.er assure, Such was the doctrine of 
defense. as elucidated by Daladier and applauded by the Chamber. Its 
basic assumptions were that entrenched fortifications with s~ffi-
cient firepower were impregnable and that any offensive resulted 
in considerable loss of men and materials. May of 1940 would prove 
how mistaken Daladier was on this point, but in 1937, his 
opinions, formed as a result of his experiences in the Great War, 
were in accord not only with the thinking of the French General 
Staff but also with the vast rnaj ori ty . of pub lie sentiment . 
The doctrine of defense, in which Daladier sincerely believed, 
and the Popular Front, about which he had reservations, were 
Daladier.'s springboards to a political comeback. By 1937, however, 
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he recognized a swing to the right in French public opinion and 
beg;an to drift a bit to the right himself. Whether this shift in 
politics, as well as those earlier in his career, was the result of 
sincere changes in Daladier's own thinking or of a desire to reflect 
the popular majority is not known, but, considering his reputation 
for honesty and sincerity, it would seem that he was not, to any 
great extent, guilty of the crass political motivation of seeking 
popular acclaim. In any event, as public esteem of the Popular 
Front declined, Daladier's popularity grew.J9 
The Popular Front had been instituted to cope with France's 
severe social problems, but it. four:Kiered on economic and foreign 
policy. The governments of · Leon Blwn and Camille Chautemps failed 
to solve French economic problems and divided France deeply over 
the Spanish Civil War. The deathblow to the Popular Front, however, 
was the annexation of Austria by the Third Reich. 
Following Adolf Hitler's meeting with Austrian Chancellor 
Kurt von Schuschnigg on February 12, 1938, and Schuschnigg's March 8 
decision to hold a plebiscite Qn the question of Austrian independ-
ence, most observers realized that German-Austrian relations had 
reached the crisis point, On March lO, Chautemps, as was his 
habit·in times of crisis, resigned as Premier. The next day 
Schuschnigg was replaced by the Austrian Nazi Arthur Seyss-Inquart, 
who was promptly told by Germany to invite the German. army into 
Austria to help maintain order. On March 13; Austria was formally 
annexed into the Gerffi;ll1 Reich, and the Anschluss, forbidden by the 
Treaty of Versailles, was completed; 
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In Paris,there was no government to _deal with ·the situation and, 
consequently, nothing .was done. Leon Blum hastiJ,.y formed a govern-
ment but d~emed it too late to act. Da],adier, his title now changed 
to Minister of National Defense, had earlier declared that nothing 
effective could pe done to save Austria, although ~f-Czechoslova.kia, 
with whom France had treaty obligations, were attacked by Germany, 
he would :imnediately order French mobilization. 20 Hitler was 
therefore permitted to continue his defiance of the.Western powers 
without opposition. 
The impact of the Anschluss on French politics was tremendous. 
French governments of the 1930's had bee~ primarily concerned with 
internal problems, but- now the focus of.attention began to shift 
to foreign affairs. Blum's goverhment lasted less than a month, 
falling on April 8, amid.strikes which were crippling French air-
craft production and damaging the rearmament effort. With the 
international situation deteriorating, strikes threatening to 
spread and the. franc declining on the international market, France 
desperately needed a man of great talent and determination to 
take camnand of the country. Consequently, Edouard Dala.dier was 
called upon to form his thiro government and received unprecedented 
votes of confidence from-both the Chamber a.n:.i the Senate. 21 
Daladier, in terms of defense-and foreign policy, was, aoove 
all else, a man of his times. The Great War had affected him much 
the same as it had affected -most Frenchmen. He abhorred warfare and 
was de:terrnined that France should never again undergo such anguish. 
if it could reasonably be avoided. He _believed that the offensive 
strategy which had been used two decades earlier was a terrible 
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mistake and that French security lie in a combination of the doctrine 
of defense, which demanded a solid defensive covering, and the. 
principle of collective security, by which several countries would 
unite to restrain the aggression of another. These two ideas, in. 
fact, were the main currents of French foreign policy during the 
inter-war years. Daladier differed from most French politicians 
of his time in his reputationi as a strong, silent man and in his 
sincerity and hopesty among the corruption and scandals of the 
Third Republic. Such was the man to whom the fate of France was 
entrusted in 1938. 
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CHAPTER III 
T.HEDEVELOPMENT OF THE SUDETEN CRISIS 
The. advent of Daladier's third goverrrnent was well received 
both in France and abroad. The Times of London, for example, 
commented favorably on the new Premier's reduction of the cabinet 
from over thirty members to nineteen for greater efficiency and 
noted that "M. Daladier has acted with the celerity ar.d firmness. 
which the occasion demanded. 111 · In evaluating the new French cabinet, 
The Times observed that: 
The Government,' s main strength, however, is the personality 
of the Prime Minister, who as Minister of Defense ... has 
gained during the. past two years a reputation both for 
ability an:I. for .firmness of character.2 
Daladier quickly justified his reputation as a strong ITiq.n by· en:ling 
the strikes which threatened the French rearmament effort and obtain-
ing parliamentary permission to rule by decree in financial 
matters, 
Among Daladier's most crucial decisions in the formation of. 
his new goverrrnent concerned the question of who should be the 
Minister.of Foreign Affairs. The previous occupant of that office 
., 
had been Joseph Paul-Boncour, a prominent member of the left wing 
of the Radical party who favored taking a strong stand against 
German expansion an:l had tried unsuccessfully to get Br>itish support 
for such measures.. Daladier, however, considered several other 
people for the Foreign Office, including Georges Bonnet, a right-wing 
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Radical who was known to be highly·intelligent and very ambitious .. 
Bonnet favored strong ties with Britain and :imitated her policy 
of ·restraint and conciliation toward Hitler's Germany. 
On the morning of April 10, Daladier interviewed Paul-Boncour 
on the question of.French foreign policy and listened to him out-'-
line his ideas about support for East European countries and resis-
tance to the use of force by Germany. In.the mip.dle of the 
conversation, Daladier received a telephone call, which Paul-Boncour 
suspected was planned in advance,3 infonning him that the Chamber 
was upset with Paul-Boncour's foreign policy ar:d that his appoint-
rrent to the Foreign Ministry might enqanger the government. Never-
the less, Paul-Boncour reports, Daladier listened to his arguments 
and. was impressed. When the new Premier hesitated to make a 
decision, Paul-Boncour told him to telephone later and went home 
to lunch. Daladier soon called and told him: 
I have thought it · over : the policy which you expour:ded to 
me is very good, very worthy of France, but I do not believe 
that we have th4 means to carry it out. I am going to take 
Georges Bonnet. 
The decision was a fateful one for Daladier and a difficult one 
for historians to understar.d in view of Daladier's subsequent 
policies which were more in accord with Paul-Boncour' s ideas than 
with Bonnet's. 
There are several possible explanations of Daladier's decision 
to drop Paul-Boncour. Parliamentary opposition might have been a 
factor, but the telephot1e call which Paul-Boncour menti0ns seems 
to have been more of an excuse.than a basic reason. On.the other 
hand, the British let Daladier know that they would not be pleased 
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with the retention of Paul-Boncour, and the decision may well 
have been aimed.,at placating the country on whose.foreign policy 
France was so. dependent at that time. Furthermore, Bonnet had just 
returned from a tour of duty as French Ambassador to the United 
States, and. Daladier probably assumed that nis app0iotment weuld be · 
favorably received in Amer:i,ca. Daladier may also have thought that· 
the choice of Bonnet would be taken in Berlin as a sign that he, 
wished-to seek peace through ponciliation with·Germany, an .attitude 
which he expressed several times in,publip speeches during the summer 
of 1938. 
In ·spite o:f these considerations, Daladier' s own statement 
to PauJ;.-Boncour should not be discounted. The new Premier was 
impressed with Paul-Boncour's agruments and very likely agreed with• 
his conclusioz:i that German aggression in the East-should be resisted. 
Indeed, thi_s · was the approo.ch that · :the Premier took in· talks with. 
the Br>itish at the em of April. But it·. should be noted that, if . 
Daladier's ·statement was an.accurate reflection of·his views; and 
there seems to be no reason to ·doubt it, then Daladier himself, as . 
Minister of·National·Defense since 1936, must share a large portion 
of the blame for the-fact that France was not in a position to 
carry out the foreign policy which he favo,red. For it was largely 
the,develo1:>ment of a purely defensive army which prevented France 
from taking· effective, aggressive action inresponse,to German 
expansion in Fast~rn Europe. Of course, Daladier may have been re-
ferring to other factors weakening France over which he had less 
control, such as internal disunity .or the lack of cooperation from 
other Fast European.countries, but, considering his subsequent 
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concern for the French military position, the fact that Daladier 
must 13hare part of the blame for the Munich Agreement is clearly 
established; Bonnet's appointment in:iicated that Daladier intended 
to take a relatively "soft" line toward Germany. Although the 
Premier and his Foreign Minister subsequently clashed over foreign 
policy, Daladier, for whatever reason, refused. to replace him, 
The choice of Bonnet as Foreign Minister was especially 
significant with regard to French policy toward Czechoslovakia. The 
peace settlement following the First World War had created Czech-
oslovakia.out of remnants of the Austro~Hungarian Dual Monarchy, 
and since that tine the Czechoslovaks had be.en among France's 
staunchest allies in the cordon sanitaire designed to restrain 
German expansion. Besides being the only country in Eastern Europe 
to preserve a democ~atic government since 1919, Czechoslovakia 
occupied a very strategic position in the heart of Central Europe 
v 
and possessed the great Skoda irriustrial works. In addition, the 
Czechoslovaks had constructed a solid wall of fortifications fac-
ing Germany and rn,ustered a tough and determined army,. Czechoslo-
vakia could therefore be of great help to France in the event of 
a conflict with Germany, both as a base from which. to attac~ Germany 
in the east and as a substantial military threat in her own right. 
French statesmen recognized the importance of Czechoslovakia .in the 
paranoid post-war years, and the relationship of the two countries 
was cemented by the Franco-Czechoslovak Treaty of Mutual Assistance 
of 1925. The treaty provided for :immediat.e assistance from either 
country if the other were the subject of unprovoked German attack 
and was generally interpreted in France to mean that, if Germany 
attacked Czechoslovakia., France was required to respond with a.ri 
attack on Germany which would ·draw enough German troops from -the 
eastern front to enable the Czechs to successfully defend them-
selves. 
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Daladier recognized the impoftance of Czechoslovakia to French· 
security, but was also aware of the c0untry '·s ,problems. Foremost 
was the min0rity pr0blem which plagued all of Eastern Europe. Of · 
the 14. 7 million people in Czechoslovakia., there were 6 .•. 8 million 
Czechs., 2.0 million.Slovaks., 3,2 million Genna.rl$., and, se:veral other 
minorities in lesser numbers.5 The Cze9hoslovak government generally 
treated its minorities well and had avoided the serious ethnic 
disputes which distrubed other Easter European countries. This 
harmonious situation ended when Adolf Hitler assumed power in 
Germany in 1933. · Espousing the Aryan Myth and dledicating .himself 
to bringing all German-speaking people into the Reich, Hitler 
instigated Nazi.agitation in the predominantly German Sudeten area 
of Czechoslovakia. By early 1938, this agitation had reached 
a fever pitch and demands were being ma.de for Sudeten.autonomy. 
Hitler's interest in the Sudetenland., however., was_ not • entirely 
racial. The area was composed partially of a series of moµntains 
which formed·a natural frontier with Germany and an effective 
barrier to the German Army. Furthermore i, most of the Czechoslovak 
fortification system· lay within the Sudet_e:hland. Hitler kn~w that 
if he _could control the Sudetenland; the rest of.C~echoslovakia, 
the heartland of Central Europe., would be his for the taking. 
The annexation·of Austria gave Germany an excellent strategic 
position vis-a-vis Czechoslovakia. The latter country was now 
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surrounded on three sides by Germany, and a potential invasion route . 
was opened through the relatively unfortified Danube plain. The 
weakening of the Czechoslovak position caused. great consternation 
in Paris. Immediately upon taking over the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, . Paul-Boncour asked the British government. for .a publi9 
delaration that . ."if Germany attacked Czechoslovakia an:i France 
went to latter's assistance, Great Britain would stand by France. 116 
Lord Halifax, the British B'oreign Secretary, refused the request 
and responded only with the evasive statement that the British. . . 
obligation to Czechoslovakia was that of one member of the League 
Nations. to another. 7 
This excnange of notes aptly illustrates the course. and.conflict 
o~ Anglo-French diplomacy in the 1930's and particularly during 
1938, The French were vitally concerned with restraining German 
power and expansion, because any growth of.Germany was regarded 
as a threat to France. But the French would not act without assured· 
British support. 8 'Ihe British, on the other hand, were extremely 
reluctant to become involved in Continental affairs and tended 
to believe that Germany deserved some degree of revision of the· 
terms of the Treaty of Versailles, Therefore 0 they took a con-
ciliatory stance toward. Germany and refused to give .France the 
diplomatic support she was .seeking. The French, insisting with 
some reason that they themselves could not establish a policy of 
I 
collective securtty, found their hands tied and reluctantly followed 
in the footsteps of British Continental policy throughout the 
second half of the 1930's. 
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:Edouard Daladier firmly believed that British support was· 
essential if any action wa~ to be taken to restrain German aggression. 
Thus, after consolidating his position in Paris, he agreed to meet· 
with British leaders in London on April 28, in an attempt to per-
suade them :that µerman agr>ession must be resisted. To determine 
beferehand France's exact bargaining position, Da:Ladier first asked 
his Chief of Staff, General Gamelin, what· military action France 
pould take against Germany to help Czechoslovakia .. Game,lin's reply 
was neither informative nor encouraging. He said that after 
complete mobilization, which Dala,_d:I,er knew· would require at least 
a week., the French could ;i.nititate offens-ive operations by land 
and. air, the effectiveness of which would depend .on the Italian 
reaction·and the extent of aid supplied to Czechoslovakia by the 
Soviet Union, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia and Great Britain. 9 
Realizing that Poland and Romania not only would n0t help Czechoslo-
vakia, but_ also would not permit Soviet troeps to pass through 
their territory to reach Czechoslovakia, Daladier could not have 
been heartened by this equivocal response. 
Wi t.h Gamelin' s note in hand, Daladier flew to London :on the 
evening of April 27 to meet with Chamberlain and his Foreign Secre-
tary, Lqrd Halifax.· Chamberlain was a sincere publ;i.c servant anq. 
was strongly dedicated to peace in Europe. When accepting his first 
national·office in 1916, at the age of 47, he wrote, "It is an 
appalling responsibility. If it was only my ,own career ~hat was at 
stake I wouldn't-care a rap, but the outcome of the war may depend 
1110 on what I do. Thus, though Chamberlain was no stranger to 
wartime leadership, he was utterly dedicated to avoiding that ta,sk 
again. Knowledge of the weighty consequence of his acts left its 
mark on Chamberlain. A photograph taken in March, 1938, shows a 
surprisingly strong face for a man.of 69--an austere contenance 
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with a broad ferehead, square jaw, bushy eyebrows: and mustache, but 
a face softened by drooping eyes that reflected the. sorrow and 
sadness born of respons.ibility. Chamberlain's ·attitude toward 
Czecnoslovakia was revealed in a letter.to his sister on March 20, 
1938: 
You have. only to look at the map to see.that nothing that 
France or we c0uld do could possibly save Czec;:hoslovakia 
from being overrun by the Gerrrans, if they wanted to do it, , . 
I have therefore ,'3.bondoned any idea of givt.lng·guarantee 
to Czechoslovakia or to. the French in connection with her 
obligations to that ·country, 11 · · · 
This statement flatly contradicted ·French policy, and, in, April, 
Daladier and Bormet, who accompanied him to London, were not able 
to sway Chqlllberlain from his policy of minimal involvement; 
'Ihe talks opened on April 28, with a discussion of proposed 
Anglo.-French air staff conversations . 12 · Halifax quickly showed 
that he would not-deviate from his Prime Minister's policy by 
stating that-the proposed conversations "should be clearly under-
stood on both. sides not to give rise in respect of-either Govern-
ment to any political undertaking nor to any obligation regarding 
the organization of national defense. 1113 The contacts were to 
assume that only Germany was the aggressor and would not encompass 
other powers either as potential enemies or allies. Halifax 
also insisted that "the first and main effort of each of us must be 
directed to hGine defense," which, to tn.e British leaders, include?-
overseas posse~sions and the protection of ·trade routes •14 · 
36 
Halifax not only stressed minimal international involvement 
with a maximum of defense, but also clearly regarded France as 
Britain's first line of defense. He proposed that air staff talks 
be directed both at coordinating the two air forces and at planning 
the movement to France on the outbreak of war an advanced British 
air contingent. Although the British appeared generous with their 
air force; they were much more careful with their army. Halifax 
commented that, concerning land forces, the best Great Britain could 
do would be to send two divisions, possibly not fully equipped, to 
France within fourteen days of the outbreak of war. 
After a recess for lunch, during which the French considered 
the British proposals, Daladier responded that the proposed air talks 
were perfectly satisfactory, but added that similar meetings between 
army and navy staffs were indispensable. Furthermore, while he 
appreciated the two British divisions, Daladier cormnented that their 
effectiveness would be greatly enhanced if they were motorized. 
Chamberlin, however, brought up limitations of manpower and the 
difficulty of obtaining munitiops from the United States as factors 
which limited the potential of equipping a land army. He also 
cautioned that the possibility of sending two divisions to France 
was not a commitment and that, therefore, army talks would be 
hypothetical and not very useful. Chamberlain maintained that 
British military participation in a war on the Continent would not· 
be sufficient to justify army or navy staff talks on the same scale 
as air conversations. Daladier's efforts to induce the British 
to be more cooperative only caused the Prime Minister to insist more 
firmly that he could not undertake any real commitment to aid the 
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French. The day closed with substantial agreement only on air talks. 
Naval talks were agreed to in principle, but no meetings were actu-
ally scheduled, and army talks were limited to the installation of 
two British divisions in France with the understanding that no 
firm commitment was involved. 
If the first day's consultations were disappointing to the 
French, the second day, concerning Czechoslovakia, only served to 
further accentuate Anglo-French differences. Halifax pointed out 
that the British government was very concerned about Czechoslovakia 
• 
because any serious incident in the Sudet~nland could have grave 
consequences. Although he acknowledged that Great Britain might be 
drawn into.war, a statement which must have made his Prime Minister 
wince., Halifax placed strong emphasis on the weaknes.s of the Czech 
military position. The Polish attitude toward Czechoslovakia was 
uncertain and it was doubtful if the Soviet Union would help 
because of internal unrest and the execution of many of.the Soviet 
Arrey High Command, Therefore, if Germany decided on hostile action, 
it would.be impossible to prevent her from achieving immediate 
success. Ha1ifax therefore proposed that the French and British 
, v 
governments jointly urge Eduard Benes, the Czec;hoslovak president, 
to settle the country's minority problems as quickly as possible, 
preferably by direct negotiations with the.Sudet~n German leader, 
Konrad Henlein. The Foreign Secretary posited a two-pro~d 
diplomatic attack. First, the German government should not·be 
encouraged to think that they could impose a settlement by force, 
and, second, it .should be made .clear to the Czechoslovak gov~rrunent 
that they should·seize this opportunity to make.a supreme effort to 
settle the Sudeten question. Halifax further suggested that the 
settlement proposals be evaluated, not only . by the.ir intrinsic 
value, but; also by their II settlement value., 11 which is to say their 
effectiveness in quieting the_Sudeten Germans.15 In other words, 
the British were making it quite clear that·their prirnary-consid-
eration was not-justice to any of the parties involved, but rather 
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the elimination of a point of tension in European diplomacy which 
they feared would ~ead to a war in which they-might become involved. 
Daladier agreed that joint diplomatic efforts should be made, 
but· placed considerably different emphasis on the direction of those 
efforts. The French Premier pointed out that Czechoslovakia had 
made more concessions to minorities than any other European country. 
It _was apparent from Herr Henlein's latest speech that his object 
was not merely further concessions, bu~ the destruction of·· the 
Czechoslovak state. If the Czechs refused the concessions proposed 
by t;he French and British governments, Daladier declared that the 
Western powers "should be prepared to support the Czechoslovak 
Government and prevent the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. 1116 
Daladier felt that pressuring only the Czechs·was inappropriate, 
since, "The ambitions of Napoleon were far inferior to the present 
aims of-the-German Reich. 1117 The French Premier feared that after 
Czechoslovakia would come the conquest of Romania. With .that 
country's wh_eat and oilfields at his disposal, Hitler would then 
turn against the West, Daladier agreed that every effort should be 
made to avoid war, but_ he was convinced this could only be done 
the determination of Great Britain and France jointly to .respect 
the liberties and rights of independent peoples. Only if the 
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British and French were firm would Yugoslavia., Romania, and Poland 
change thei.J;' atti(cud.e and actively support peace. "If, however, we 
were once again to capitulate when faced by another threat, we 
should then have prepared the wey for the very war we wished to 
avoid. 1118 Daladier disagreed with Halifax's assertion that the 
Czechs could not be effectively supported on the basis that the 
Czechoslovak defences were strong and that firm Anglo-French action 
could bring support from other East European nations. If Great 
Britain and France pressured Czechoslovakia and at the same time 
declared that they would not permit the destruction of the Czecho-
slovak state, Daladier felt that peace could be saved. 
Chamberlain, however, was unmoved by Daladier,'s reasoning. He 
contended that Daladier' s suggest.ion of pressure on Germany "was 
what the Americans .in their card games called bluff. 1119 In view 
of the military situation, he did not think that pressure on 
Germany would be successful. Chamberlain saw no wey to save Czecho-
slavakia and hoped.only to avoid war. Daladier continued to argue 
that: 
if there were not signs of a determined policy an:i a 
corrmon agreement between His Majesty's Government and 
the French Government, we should then have decided the 
fate of Europe, and he could only regard the future 
with the greatest pessimism.20 
Unfortunately, the French Premier could not persuade the British to 
undertake any commitment to preserve Czechoslovakia. 
By the en:i of ~he day's conversations, the two governments had 
agreed only to a limited diplomatic effort. They would make a 
simultaneous demarche in Prague to ask for maximum concessions to 
the Sudetens. The British government would report this diplomatic 
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intervention td the Germans and ask for their position, observing 
that British efforts in Prague obviated the need for German action. 
If a peaceful solution could not be reached by this means, His 
Majesty's Government would point out to Germany that if she resorted 
to force, France would be c0mpelled to intervene and the British 
government could not guarantee that they would not do the same. Al-
though this statement was not the support Daladier had envisaged, 
he had at least provoked the.British into taking action to assist 
in the settlement of the Sudeten problem. 
Although Parisian newspapers generally rejoiced that Great 
Britain had compromised, Daladier took a more sanguine view of the 
talks. 21 "The only advance that I could note after that long day 
of talks," he. later observed, "was that England no longer held 
aloof from Czechoslovakia, and that she, together with ourselves, 
accepted joint action, though solely on a diplomatic level. 1122 
The April conversations illustrate a clear pattern in Anglo-French 
relations of French leaders urging support for a policy of firmness 
while the British tried to avoid commitment on the Continent. Both 
were trying to avoid war but were using very different tactics to 
achieve that end. Hindsight shows us that the French approach 
was more likely to meet with success than the British, but the 
tragedy of the situation is that the French could not and would not 
pursue a policy of firmness toward Germany without assured British 
support. 
Hindsight also gives us the impression that Daladier was much 
more aware of the subtleties of the international situation thi311 
Chamberlain or Halifax. While this may indeed have been so, the 
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situation was not necessarily as clearcut then as it appears now. 
Daladier was actually torn between the conflicting policies advocated 
by various members, of his cabinet. Si~ William Strang, a member 
of the British Foreign Office who had a rather poor opinion of· 
French leadership, noted just. before the April conversations that: 
Unlike the British Government, the French Goverrnnent 
were deeply,divided, with Ge0rges Mam.el and his friends· 
all for resistance and Georges Bonnet·and his like for 
surrend.er, and with F.douard Daladier · . . . torn between 
the two, leaning towards a robust policy, but lacking 
the resolution to h0ld to it. 23 · 
Furthermore, a week after the talks, Daladeir indicated that he 
had doubts about some of the very arguments he had used to dispute 
Jialifax, When asked by William .Bullitt, who was his close friend. 
as well as Ambassador from the United State~, if France would go 
to war with Germ.any if the latter attacked Czechoslovakia, Daladier 
r>eplied!l "With what?1124 After noting that "the contentions in 
Europe today depend on force and force alone," Daladier observed 
that French aircraft production, which had doubled in the past 
month from forty-two to eighty-four planes per month, was totally 
inadequate to cope with Germany's estimated production of five hun-
dred planes per month. In view of the disparity between the French 
and German air forces, the French Premier judged that it would be 
:impossible for France to go to war. to protect Czechoslovakia. 
Daladier continued that he had considered the position of 
Czechoslovakia hopeless since the annexation of Austria,by Germany. 
The Anschlluss meant that Germany could force whatever concessions 
it wanted out of the Czechoslovaks through economic pressure alone; 
military action was not necessary. 25 Bullitt.' s evaluation of the · 
42 
situation indicat.ed that Br'itish am. French .action would be based· 
on the assumption that the dissolution of Czechoslovakia was inevit-
able and the best that could be hoped for was that it would take 
place without bloodshed and in such,.a way as to save the face of 
France · and of England. 26 Thus., whi.le Daladier' s public statanents 
continued to express a. policy of .firmness, it is apparent that he 
haq pri:vate doubts about.the ability of France to effectively aid 
Czechoslovakia. 
Daladier's undercurrent of doubt and preoccupation with internal 
problems led to.inaction, and Br>itish initiative was asserted in 
the Sudeten pro'Qlem. The joint demarche agreed to by Daladier. and 
Cham~~rlain in April was presented to the:Czechoslovak.government 
on May 7, and· .the British plan wa$ clearly followed: Czechoslovakia 
was pressUJ;>ed for concessions while little.was done in Berlin after 
the Germans responded that the problem was a matter between Herr 
Henleip and Prague. 27 · However, in .less than two weeks, German 
troop movements on the Czech 1:>order. caused· an internaticmal · crisis . 
which, caused the Br>itish to intensify the:ir efforts to nE?gotiate 
a settlement· and cau.sed Daladier to lean even more strongly toward 
a policy of resistance.· 
On .May 18, 1938, Czech intelligence reported concentrations 
of German· tr0ops on th~ Bohemian bord.er. Fearing a German· attempt 
to influence·· the forthcoming municipal elections, Benei · ordered 
a partial mobilization to display Czech resistance to the Nazi 
regime. Henlein promptly broke off negotiations with the Czechoslo-
vak government, and it appeared that Germany was about to intervene 
militarily, Tne tense situaticm produced a flurry of diplomatic 
activity in London and Paris. Whj,le Hitler denied that any troop 
concentrations were taking place, British and French diploma.ts 
tried to exert pressure in Prague and Berlin to ease the cr.isis. 
First, Halifax urged .the Germans to influence Henl~in . to resume . 
negotiations, but Tflet only stubborn refusal in Berlin •. Bonnet; 
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meanwhile,. was .endeavoring both to restrai~ the Czechs from further 
provo-cat:i.on of Germany and to persuade the British .to deliver to 
Germany th~ warning they riad promised on April 29. In tl1e midst of 
the.crisis; the French Foreign Minister was publicly following 
Daladier's policy of firmness toward Germany and.support of France's 
treaty obligations ·with Czechoslovakia.. On May 21 he told reporters, 
"If.Germany crosses·the Czech frontier that will automatically 
start war. 1128 
The British, meanwhile, uphe:Ld their promise to the French. 
On May· 22; Halifax sent a personal message to. the German Foreign 
Minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop, warning that if resort were ma.de 
to forcible measures_, Germany could not count ·on .Great Britain stay-
ing out of the.ensuing corµ'lict. 29 Hitler was enraged by Czecho-
slovak resistance and by Anglo-French firmness, but he also was -_ 
not yet .ready to wage, war for Czechoslovakia. The day after Halifax's 
message reached Berlin, the Chancellor issu~·a statement insist-
ing that the Reich had no aggressive intentions toward the Czechs 
and that the rumors of troop concentrations were ·without .-foundation. 
The Czechs responded, under French prodding, by withdrawing their 
I 
troops fyom the frontier, and the crisis quic~ly pass-ed. Mea,nwhile, 
Henlein and the Sudeten.German Party swept all the local elections 
in the Sudetenland., increasing their bargaining power in Prague 
and their prestige abroad. 
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While most Frenchmen breathed a sigh of relief that British 
firmness with Gennanyhad.p.voided war, the situation under the sur-
face was not quite so encouraging to Daladier. In spite of the· 
British leaders' relatively resolute stand toward·Germany during 
the crisis, they had taken a very different position toward France. 
Following Halifax '·s message to Ribbentrop, the British government 
reported this. step to the French and added that they would. aid 
France if she were subjected to an unprovoked German attack. But, 
on the other hand, Halifax stressed that the warning to Germ\my did 
not mean that Great Britain would join France in an attack on 
Germany in support of·Czechoslovakia. 30 In other words, unless 
Ge~ actually attacked .France without provocation,, which Hitler 
had no intention of doing at that time, Great Britain would stay 
out of any Continental conflict. To the French, whose treaty obli'-
gations required them to join the conflict if Germany attacked 
Czechoslovakia, the British state~nt was a clear warning that 
Britain did not intend to becorne'militarily involved in the Sudeten 
situation and that the French should not count on such aid. 
To make matters worse, the French position wa.s not a great 
deal more secure than the British, for Bonnet, in spite of his 
performance during the crisis, was also very reluctant to support 
Czechoslovakia. The French Foreign Minister responded to the 
.British warning by assuring the British Ambassador, Sir Eric Phipps, 
that France was ready to apply any necessary pressure on Czechoslo-
vakia to avoid having to .choose between war.or defaulting on the 
treaty, including the warning that if Czechoslovakia were not·rea:-
sonable, France would consider herself released from the treaty. 3l 
Since the execution .of French foreign policy was normally handled 
by the, Fore.ign Office and Bonnet, the Frerich and. British :appeasers 
were able to mutualy reinforce each other and convince . themselves · 
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that Czechoslovakia should be abandoned.· When Daladier,vccasionally 
tried to introduce a note of firmness into French foreign policy, 
he found that he was fighting not only his own doubts and the 
British Foreign .Office, but his own Mini~ter of Foreign Affairs as 
well. While Bonnet and the British appeared to learn nothing from. 
the success of British resistance in the May Crisis, Daladier must 
have been enouraged by it, since his actions and statements of the 
succeeding months show an ever increasing determination to aid and 
defend Czechoslovakia. The most significant reaction to the May 
i 
Cr1sis, however, occurred in Germany. On May 30, Adolf Hitler, 
still fuming over Czech resistance, signed the.directive for "Oper-
ation Green," the code name for the invasion of Czechoslovakia, 
in which he emphatically declared, "It is my unalterable decision 
to smash Czechoslovakia by military action inthe near future. 1132 
The attack was scheduled to take place not later than October 1. 
Hitler's resolve, of c.ourse, was not kn()wn in Paris or London, 
and the summer months of.1938 exemplified a post-crisis cautious 
relaxation of international tempers. The British government 
consts3l1.tly pressured the Czechoslovaks to reach a prompt settlement 
with the SudE;;tens and urged the French to exert similar pressure .. 
While the French also recornnended a speedy settlement, they were 
less overbearing than the British and occasionally found it 
necess~y to caution His Majesty'·s Government that Czechoslovakia· 
should · not be pushed too far. 33 · 
Also unknown to the Western governments was the fact that 
Henlein had·.strict orders .from.Hitler to gradually increase his 
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demands SQ that no settlement could be reached ~ith the Czecholovak 
government.34 Daladier-., familiar with Hitler's methods, may have 
suspected .this arrangement·, -for on June 23 he told Bullitt :that ):ie · 
was not confident in the apparent improvement in the European situa-
tion. He expected Czechoslovakia to make a reasonable offer to 
the,Sudentens but doubted that either the Sudetens or the Germans 
would accept. If ·the matter came to war, Daladier held. that "France 
could. not preserve her honor if she should run away from war. 1135 
Whether England,. iiked it or not, France would not hesitate to go 
to war to defend Czechoslovakia, provided Czech concessions were· 
considered reasonable. These were brave words from a man who had 
seen: the· carnage of Verdun, and they were no doubt ·uttered as mu.ch 
for di.plomatic effect as ·· out 0f conviction. Daladier did not want 
-war, but neither was he willing to tarnish the honor of France. 
If a way could be found to honorably settle the Sudeten dispute 
without recourse to war; he was .eager to find it. 
The British were not so concerned about French honor-and.were 
becoming very impatient with the lack of·progress in Prague. In 
mid-July Chamberlain proposed sending an independent mediat.or to, 
Czechoslovakia to help settle the dispute. To ,fill this post, the 
Prime Minister proposed Lord Runcirnan, a nearly seventy-year-old 
British businessman of fundamentally conservative nature who _ten:ied 
to agree with the British government that the Czechs were 
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deliberately · stalling the negotiations. Daladier and Bonnet quickly 
a.gJ?eed., but President Benes was quite upset by·the British proposal 
until he was · finally convinced · that · Runcifnan' s mission was not 
I 
to impose a British sett.lement on the Czechs .• 
'Ihe Czechoslovak government formally accepi;;ed.the·British 
offer of a mediator on July ~3; and Lor<:i Runciman ,.arrived ip Prague 
on August 3. Although his mission was .favorably: commented on, by the 
' ! . . ' 
' \ 
press, it quickly became the farce that Bene~ must have feared. 
Rur).ciman seldom associated with th~·Czechs but was lavishly enter-
tained by.the Sudeten leaders., who. took advantage of his taste 
for hunting., fishing., golf, ancl social gatherings •. Wealthy 
Sudeten Nazis· saw t0. it that this supposedly independent mediat.or 
spent more time being indoctrinated by their side than in actual 
mediation. 'Ihe. object of this indectrination was clearly explained 
to the Sudeten negotiating team by one of their leaders: 
It is the duty of the·Sudeten-German Party te convince 
His Lordship (Runciman) that the nat~onality problem in 
Czechoslovakia cannot be solved within the State, and 
that the Czechs .are in no way prepared to make conces-
sions of a kind that could lead to a real pacification 
of the State. His Lordship must take I away witl'l him the 
impression that the situati0n in this state is so cqr;i-
fu.sed and difficult that. it cannot be cleared up by 
negotiation or diplomatic action, that the blame for 
this lies exclusively with the Czechs, and thus that the 
Czechs are the real disturit;ers'of.peace in Europe.36 
' ' ' I ' . . 
Under such intense Sudeten tutelage., Runciman's decision was easd.ly 
predictable. 'Ihe Sudet~n leaders., however., managed to p4t 0ff 
any definitive settlement until Nazi agitation made the sit~tion 
so acute that German.annexation of the Sudetenland appeared to be 
I . . 
the only possible means of avoiding further disturbances. 
48 
It is perhaps convenient to pause here to consider the various 
factors which weighed on Daladier's mind as the month of.' Munich 
drew near and led him to consider cession of the Sudetenland to 
Germany, Forem0st among his concerns was the. inadequacy of French 
military capabilities in a struggle with Germany. The First World 
War had destroyed aJJnost an entire generation of French youth, 
That factor combined with a low birth-rate to put France at a severe 
population disadva.ptage vis-a-vis Germany .. The French male pop-
ulation between the ages of twenty and. thirty-four, the arms.,, 
carrying years, was le1;1s than half that of Germany--roughly .four 
million to nine mil1ion-meq.l'ling th~t Germany could put considerably 
more soldiers in the field than France,37 
Furthermore, Dala.dier knew that the French army lacked the 
offensive capacity to adequately fulfill its treaty obligations by 
attacking Germany if-that country invaded Czechoslovakia. Not only 
was the army .totally geared to defense, but Dalad.ier was also 
aware that work on the Siegfried Line, Germany's answer to the 
Maginot ·Line, was progressing at full speed. Since Daladier's own 
military theories told him that entrenched fortifications were 
impregnable., he _believed that an assault on the German; line would 
have little effect other than to decimate the French army.· Daladier 
told Bullitt on September 8 that a French attack on Germany wd~ld 
be very costly and would not get very far, but nevertheless main-
tained that France was bound by interests of honor and public 
decency-to make such an attack if Germany threat~ned Czechosler 
ak . 38 v ia. 
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Daladier's fears about the weakness of French air power have 
already been commented upon. 'Ihese fears, however, were greatly 
intensified at-the end of August when General Joseph Vui'.l.lemin, 
Commander in Chief of the French Air Force, visited Germany and was 
treated to an impressive display 0f power by the German Luftwaffe. 
Before returning to Paris, Vuillemin told the French Ambassador in 
Berlin, Andre Franrois-Poncet, that in case of war, French planes 
would disappear from the skies within two weeks. 39 The French 
general repeated his observation toDaladier, who could only encour-
age work to increase French aircraft production and intensify his 
efforts to purchase planes from the United States. While Vuille-
min' s .statement, as well as many of Daladier' s other fears about 
French military weakness, proved to be exaggerated, there can be 
no doubt that these_ concerns were a major factor in Daladier's 
eventual decision not to go to war over Czechoslovakia. 
Unable t0 face Germany alone, France could only turn to her 
friends for aid. But her closest and mcj)st powerful ally, Great 
Britain, had already bluntly informed France that she would not 
help unless France were flagrantly attacked by Germany. 'Ihe Soviet 
Union had a mutuai assistance treaty with Czechoslovakia similar 
to that of France, but there were problems with its implementation. 
Soviet aid to Czechoslovakia was conditional upon prior French 
response. Russ1a would march only after France did, and the Soviets 
seemed to think that France would not march. Furthermore, since 
the Soviet Union did not border on Czechoslovakia, Russian aid 
could be supplied only by passing through Poland or Romania; 'Ihese 
countries were more afraid of the Soviet colossus than they were 
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of Germany a.ind refused even to let the Soviet Air Force, the largest 
in Europe, fly over their terTitory to reach Czechoslovakia. 'Ihe 
Czechs could not count on help from other Ea.st European nations, 
ar;i their partners in.the Little Entente, Romania and Yugoslavia, 
appeared intent on staying out of the conflict_. Cz~choslovakia' s 
other neighbors, Poland and Hungary, far from wanting.to aid the 
Czechs, were actually anxious to help themselves to slices of 
Czechoslovakian te1°ritory. 'Ihe Polish attitude, serious thought it 
was, did not completely overcome Daladier' s sense of humor.. When · 
William Bullitt referred to the Polish intention to seize Slovakia 
and split it with Hungary, the-French Premier, "with a twinkle 
in his eye said that he hoped to live long enough to pay.Poland 
for her cormorant attitude in the present crisis by proposing a new 
partition of. Poland to Gzechosl~vakli.a. 1140 Had this little diplo-
matic joke becane public, the Poles, no doubt would have found a 
way to be even more recalcitrant with regard to the Sudeten situa-
tion, but, as it was, their predatory posture represented a serious 
setback.in Daladier's attempts to establish collective security in 
Eastern Europe and left France isolated. 
A further consideration was Daladier's attitude toward Czecho-
slovakia. In. none of his public speeches or private . corrnnents did 
Daladier indica.te that his determination to uphold French treaty 
obligations to Czechoslovakia was based upon any particularly high 
regard for the Czech people. Inq.eed, he appeared sympathetic 
to the Sudeten cause when he told Bullitt that the Sudeten was 
been badly treated by the Czechs and had a genuine grievance. 'Ihe 
Czechs . had suffered under German domination for centuries and, now 
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that: .the. stick· was in. the other hand:, it was understandable 1:;hat 
· . 41, i' 
the. Czecns weuld tend to abuse the Sudeten Germans.; . Bull ·tt also 
reported to his superiors in Washington that. Daladier. had: ex:pressed 
q,pp0siti0n: to the peace treaties of the First W0r~d · Wat'. and haQ. . 
pointedqut the necessity of revising the Czechoslovak state.twenty 
. . . : 42. . . . 
years earl~er. irhe .American Ambassad0r insisted _that Daladier 
had·net changed his mind at>out.Czechoslevakia, althol,lgh he was. 
ada.ma,nt t:q.at revision be accompl;is}:led by p~aceful agreement 
rather than at,the point .of a gun. Viewed, from thisper1;3pective, 
Daladier,'s determination.to defend Czech0sl0vak:La-must have t)een. 
difficult to maintain .. irhe justificati0n.whicn he. ml:)st fyequent1y 
gave for h0lding that f)Ositi0n was that French h0n0r weulq.·be :.·~. 
impugned- if'' the .c0untry di9, .not stand by her tre.aty commitments· 
. . 
to Czechoslovakia. Since Daladier was predisposed te the revision 
of· the Czephoslevak st.ate, his: primary cenc~rn waf;i that changes 
i 
be· made in a peaceful and _honcDrable :ma.nr:i.er. Whil~. Daladier dis-, 
played understandable reluctance to give in ·to German-pressure, 
' . . . · .. ,·' . : \ 
since.he had reap. Mein Kampf a.ne1 was aware of HitJ.,er's intentions 
! 
in Eastern Europe.,_ he was.als0 very reluctant to c®lTl!lrl.t,France to 
. ' i 
repeat the ordeaL which she. had suffered twenty. years, earlier. 
• . . . ; !· ' ·, i 
While.' theEJe th0iqghts Yfere churning in Daladi~r' s mind, ev~nts . . . . 
were not standing still in Central Europe .. · . The G~rrnan Mirlist~r of 
Prop~~., Joseph Geebbles, wra,s .stepping u~ his .two-:-prong~d attack 
0n,Czech0s~o~ia. 43 llie first tack c0~siste¢1 .. of_ accus:1-ne; .the·. 
I 
Czechs of c0llusion with Soviet ·Russi;a., asserting .that Behem.ia, 'the. 
part of Czechos],ovakia wh;i.ch .p:ret,ruded deep il1,to Ge~~ had·· peen 
c0vered with airfieJ.Els to serye as a base fo~ Rus~ian.air strikes 
. ' . . . ' . 1 
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against the Fatherland, thus.making Czechoslovakia· a permanent 
menace to German security. The second theme accused Prague of .sys-
1 
tematically · mistreating Sudeten Gerrr:ans. The German press provided 
da:i,ly accounts,, all fabricated or wildly exaggerated, of Czech 
atrocities and "inj.ust·ices to the: people of the Sudetenland. Many 
of the reported incidents.were actually instigated by Sudeten Nazis 
as a part of their program to build up mistrust and hatred of the, 
Prague government. 
Goeobels' propaganda had a noticeable effect in London. As 
early as June 17, the. British government had proposed to the French 
that Czechoslovakia be approached regarding the remodeling of her 
treaty arrangements with France and the Soviet Union, 01;1 the·. theory 
that these treaties were regarded as provocative by Germany and that 
'this provocation was the root cause of Germany's conflict with the 
Czechs. 44 Overlooked.by the British was the fact that the treaties 
under discussion were purely defensive and therefore could hardly 
be taken as a serious provocation in Berlin. The French government 
stalled as long as possible, but, finally, on August 10, Bonnet 
replied that neutralization of Czechoslovakia .should·be a last resort 
and that presentation of this idea at that moment would be an un-
i 4 
necessary escalation of conces~;l.op,s. 5 Thus, months before Munich, 
the British were urging concessions which would have drastically 
altered French security arrangements in the East, while the French 
government, led by Da1adier, was resisting those concessions in 
hopes that a settlement more favorable to Czechoslovakia could be 
reached; 
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The situation was becoming all the more critical because by 
this time both the French and British were aware of Hitler's deter-
mination to use force against Czechoslovakia. When General 
Vuillemin was touring Germany in August, Hermann Goering, Commander 
of the Luftwaffe, asked him what would happen if Germany were com-
pelled to take forcible action in Czechoslovakia. 46 · The general 
responded that France would irrmediately help Czechoslovakia. Goering 
appeared disappointed.but remarked that the treaty would not come 
into play if the Czech were the aggressors. If this could be 
engineered, then France ~ould be in the position that, if she 
considered Germany the real aggressor and helped the Czechs, she 
could not count on aid from Great Britain. Furthermore, the French 
had unconfirmed information that infiltrated German Nazis were 
working to arouse a popular uprising among the Sudeten Germans in 
the hope that Germany would have an opportunity to intervene follow-
ing Czech action to suppress the insurrection. 47 In addition, 
Foreign Minister Bonnet told William Bullitt on August 26 that redent 
conversations of German ministers in Romania and Yugoslavia indicated 
that Germany intended to use force against Czechoslovakia. 48 
The. British .had even more concrete evidence. On AUgUst 21, a 
highly placed .informant told the British Military Atta.che in '.Berlin 
that·Hitler had announp.ed his intention to attack Czechoslovakia by 
the end of September. 49 British strategists, hm~ever, chose to 
ignore the warning,·and there is no evidence that the French were 
ever informed of.this intelligence, 
The lack of Anglo-French cooperation made matters easier for 
Hitler. In early September, .following the Chancellor's timetable, 
the .crisis began to.c.ome to .a. head. The .annual German Nazi Party 
Congress met.at.Nuremberg.from September 5 to September 12, and 
Hitler's opening remarks were extremely incendiary,_ Throughout 
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the week his lieutenants.tried to outdo him in threatening 
Czechoslovakia. All.of .Europe waited tensely for Hitler's closing 
address on. the twelfth,_ fearing that the Fuehrer would .burn all .. his 
bridges and leal(e no.re.course but war. 
Hoping to avert Gerrnari. mobilization or•extreme statements by 
Hitler., leaders in Prague, Paris and London all tqok steps to induce . 
Hitler to tak€ a more moderate stand in his closing speech at the 
Nureplberg Sportpalast • First, Benes decided to give in to the 
Sudetens. On September 5, he called in two Sudeten leaders and 
asked them to write out their full demands,_ Whatever they were, he 
would accept them. While the French and British were quite pleased· 
with.this decisive step toward a settlement, the Sudeten Germans 
were stunned. To avoid.reaching an agreement, they arranged a 
"provocation. 1150 On September 7, several Sudeten Party deputies 
who were looking into the. arrest of eighty-three Sudeten Germans 
for gunrunning and spying started a quarrel with Czech police. One 
of the deputies .was struck with a whip by a Czech officer, and the 
Sudeten delegation promptly broke off negotiations until the.affair 
could be settled. 
Meanwhile, in Paris, Daladier sought to restrain Hitler by a 
demonstrati0n of French .resistance to the use of force. On 
September 8, the French Premier met with the German Charge d'Affaires 
and assured him that whatever course England tcok, the French 
government would order immediate mobilization and attack Germany at 
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once l'if the foot of a German soldier should cross the Czechoslovak 
frontier. 11 51 Daladier told the.American Ambassador that he made 
these remarks to show the Germans that however mu~h England might 
wobble or vacillate, .there. would be no hesitation on the part of· 
France. Daladier was convinced that if Hitler.were.permitted to 
settle the Sudeten question by force, there would beno more public 
law in Europe. 52 
While maintaining this strong stand, Daladier was. careful not 
. to close the door to .accorno.dation with Germany:. He also told the 
Gernia.n Charge that the Sud1;::tenGermans had a genuine grievance and:, 
if they wanted autonomy, they should have it .. Furthermore, if they 
wanted to join Germany respecting the principle of self-
determination, Daladier ·had no basic objection, but he could not 
permit Hitler to settle the matter by force. The French Premier 
was, in-effect, paving the way for the cession of-the Sudetenland 
to Germany. He made it known that he had no objection to Germany 
obtaining possession of that area, as ·long as it was done peacefully; 
but if Hitler resorted t.o war, France would fight. 
Daladier I s firm stand was reported to London by Phipps : 
M. Daladier declares most positively that, if German 
troops cross the Czechoslovak frontier, the French will 
march to a man. They realize perfectly well that this 
will riot be for les beaux yeux of the Czechs but for 
their own skins, as, after a given time, Germany would, 
with enormously increased strength, turn against France.53 
The British Ambassador also commented that Daladier was quite opti-
mistic since the Siegfried Line appeared incomplete and the French 
internal situation was considerably improved. 
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While Daladier was steadfastly maintaining_his stance that 
only resistance to German aggression could curb Hitler's ambitions,-
the British, as another crisis approached, again displayed a bit of 
determination. On September .2, the British delivered a mild, 
but significant, warning to Germany. The British Ambassador in 
Berlin, Sir Neville .Henderson, who was very reluctant to make any 
statement which might antagonize the Germans, intimated to the 
Undersecretary of the German Foreign Office, Baron Ernst-von Weiz-
saecker.that,if German troops should enter Czechoslovakia and 
France then declared war on Germany, it would be almost impossible 
for Great Britain to avoid fighting on the French side. 54 Although 
Henderson tempered.the.warning so as to make.italmost:meaningless, 
the British government made .a somewhat less equivocal declaration 
onthe eve of-Hitler's.speech.at Nuremberg. On September 11; the 
British Foreign Office issl.l-ed an authorized statement warning 
Berlin not-to indulge in illusions about the .gravity of the Sudeten 
situation. The statement cautioned the German government not to 
believe that it could attack Czechoslovakia without.facing "the 
possibility of-intervention,by France and thereafter by Great 
Britain. 1155 
However, behind .the facade of British resolutioh, the story 
was once very different. On September 10, Bonnet probably~· at 
the instigation of Daladier, told Phipps that if .Germany attacked 
the Czechs, France would mobilize. The Foreign Minister put the 
question to Phipps point-blank, "We are going to marbh, will you 
march with us?1156 The confidential British response of September 12 
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was much less encouraging.to .the French than their.public statement 
of the previous day: 
While His Majesty 1 .. s Government would never allow the 
security of France.to.be threatened, they.are unable to 
make precise . statements .of . the character .of .their future 
action, or the time at-which it. would.be.taken, in cir-
cumstances that .they.cannot .at present foresee.57 
According to Phipps, .Bonnet !'seemed genuinely pleased at the nega-
tive nature of your reply.to this question.".~8 . Thus, while the 
British government .continued .its .:refusal to make .any .. substantial 
commitment to the French, .Bonnet was seeking a policy .more in line 
with that of the British than.with that of his own Premier. 
In spite of this behind-the-scenes equivocation, the efforts 
of the Prague, Paris .anci Lcm&on governments to restrain Hitler 
were evidently not without effe¢t. For in his speech on September 12, 
the Fuehrer, although he bitterly attacked the Czechs and called 
for self-determination for Bne ,§U'deten 'Germans, refrained from 
declaring outright.that Germa.t'l.y.i4Guld take military action against 
the Czechs. The Western gov.e:rnmerits reacted to the speech with 
cautious approval. .. Daladier and Bonnet thought it was not so 
dangerous as. they had expected, and the Faireign.Minis..ter felt that 
Hitler had left the door.open to further negotiations.59 Although 
the British.also .breathed.a.sigh-of relief that.no.ult:imatum had 
been delivered, the Sudeten Germans reacted with demonstrations, 
riots which resulted in several deaths, and attacks .on.Czech police. 60 
The Czechoslovak government was forced to proclaim martial law to 
restore order, and Sudeten leaders responded with an ult:imatum d~-
manding that martial law.be rescinded and that a plebiscite be held 
on the question of cess:i,.o:Q6f the Sud~tenland to Germany. 
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Fearing that Hitler would use the unrest .in the Sudetenland as 
an excuse to launch his.attack., .Bonnet panicked.and completely lost 
his nerve. The French.Foreign.Minister called.Phipps several times 
on September 13 to.urge .that .Lord Runcima.n take imnediate action 
to cool tempers in .Czechoslovakia. Bonnet-.insisted that ."peace must 
be preserved at any.price as.neither France nor Great.Britain were 
ready for war. 1161 No.doubt, Bonnet's collapse .was hastened by a 
report from the American .Colonel Charles Lindbergh .who had just 
returned from a tour ..o.f. Germany-and was horrified.at the prepond-
erance of German military strength. 62 Lindbergh estimated that 
Germany had .8 ,.000 .rnilitar.y .. aircraft . and a . production capacity of 
1,500 planes per month~ Although this was an exaggeration of as 
much as four times, Bonnet, .and Daladier for that matter, could only 
be impressed by the .Colonel.'.s observations. Phipps, who thoroughly 
agreed with Bonnet 1.s attitude a;J._though he was .not so panicky, 
telephoned London and told Halifax, "His Excellency [Bonnet] seems 
completely to have.lost his nerve and to be ready.for any solution 
to avoid war. 1163 
The British Ambassador was so concerned about Bonnet's state 
of mind that he sought an :immediate conference.with Daladier. The-
French Premier had.not.panicked.bµt was despondent over the prdspect 
of imminent war. The previous day he had met _with his chief 
military advisors who told.him that the Siegfried Line could not be 
broken at the beginning of the hostilities .and that, even if Germany 
were cormnitted in Czechoslovakia and had to protect her Polish f'lank, 
she would still have enough.troops on the Rhine to be 9n a numerical 
par with France. 64 Under Phipps' questioning, Daladier.stood by his 
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September 8 statement, but did so "with evident lack of enthusiasm." 
Phipps concluded that :. 
M. Daladier of today was quite a different one to the 
M. Daladier of September 8, and tone and language were 
very different indeed. I fear the French have been 
bluffing, although I have continually pointed out to 
them that one cannot bluff Hitler.65 · 
Daladier was obviously worried. He .went so far as to telephone 
Chamberlain to propose that Lord Runciman immediately announce that 
he would soon present a plan to resolve the Sudeten coniflict and 
that the mediator try to bring the two parties together in his pres-
ence for more substantive discussions. If this should prove in-
sufficient, Daladier further proposed a three-rower conference, 
with Germany representing the :sudetrens, France representing the 
Czechs and Great Britain representing Lord Runcirna.n, to obtain the 
pacific settlement which Hitler had advocated in his speech the 
previous night. 66 Unfortunately, the two leaders had a bad connec-
tion, and Chamberlain apparently did not understand the substance 
of Daladier's comments. However, Daladier understood Chamberlain 
to reply "that he had come to a decision some time before, a decision 
he believed would be useful, and that he would tell me about it 
67· later."· 
Daladier's call to London illustrates several important points. 
First, it shows how dependent the French were on British foreign 
policy and to what degree British initiative prevailed in dealing 
with Germany. Daladier, rather than taking direct action himself, 
was asking the British mediator to. do something. Second, it brings 
out the lack of coordination in Anglo-French diplomacy toward the 
ThJird Reich, for Chamberlain had taken a momentous step and would 
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not ·· tell the French about it. Finally, it shows that Daladier, 
although he had not forsaken the French cormnitment to Czechoslovakia, 
was doing everything within his power to insure that the terms of 
the Franco-Czechoslovak Treaty would not be called into play. 
Daladier, realizing that Chamberlain probably had not· understocxl 
him over. the telephone, quickly put his proposals into writing and· 
sent them off to Lon:ion. However, when the British Prime Minister 
finally received-them, he did not give them serious consideration. 
Chamberlain had for several weeks been considering a personal meet-
ing with Hitler to discuss tne Sudeten situation, and now, with 
tensions mounting feverishly and upon-Runcipian's insistence that 
the announcement of a prospective settlement would do nothing to 
restore law and order, Chamberlain disregarded the French suggestions 
and sent a personal message to Adolf Hitler: 
In view of the increasingly critical situation I propose 
to come over at once to see you with a view to trying 
to find a peaceful solution. I propose to come across 
by air and am ready to start tomorrow. 68 
·Without consulting his French allies, Chamberlain had taken a 
decisive step which put the negotiations over the Sudetenland on a 
new plane, one that boded ill for; Czechoslovakia. 
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CHAPTER IV 
DAYS OF DR.A.MA AND TRAGEDY 
September 15-30, 1938 
The Chancellor of the Third Reich was delighted with Chamber-
lain' s offer and accepted mmediately. The prospect of the. sixty-
nine year old British Prime Minister flying to Germany not only 
flattered Hitler :immensely but also indicated to him how far the 
Western Powers were willing to go to settle the Sudeten conflict. 
Furthermore, just before receiving Chamberlain's message, the 
Fuehrer received word from the German Charge.in London that Cham-
, berlain considered European war unavoidable after Hitler's 
September 12 speech and was therefore prepared "to examine far-
reaching German proposals, including plebiscite, to take part in 
carrying them into effect, and to advocate them in public. 111 
According to one Munich historian, the word "plebiscite" was the 
key to Hitler that he had been right about the willingness of the 
West to give way. 2 When the Chancellor re~eived Chamberlain's offer, 
he knew that Great Britain and France would abandon Czechoslovakia. 
The Fuehrer did not even bother to meet Chamberlain half way. 
The British Prime Minister had to fly across Germany to Hitler's 
mountain retreat at Berchtesgaden. When he arrived on September 15, 
no time was wasted admiring the magnificent Bavarian panorama. 3 
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'Ihe Fuehrerq,uickly ma.de his position clear: three million Sudeten 
· Germans were being persecuted by the Czechs., and Hitler was deter-
mined that they would be brought into the. Reich. 'Ihe basis of 
his argWnent was racial unity. He wanted only Germans, no Czechs. 
But the Chancellor wo{ild go to any length~ to get what he wanted.· 
He claimed that three hundred Sudetens had been killed and that 
the situation must be settled at once. "I do not ca.re if there is 
war or not: I am determined to sett.le it soon., and am prepared 
. . . 4 
to risk a world war rather than to allow this to drag on." 
At this point., · the. Prime Minister sensed an impasse and almost 
closed the discussion. · But Hitler mollified his tone and suggested 
. that a settlement by negotiation might still be possible if the 
British government were prepared to accept the principle of the 
succession of the Sudeten territory on the basis of national self-. 
determination as the foundation of future talks. Chamberlain 
agreed personally., but could not act without consulting the French 
government and Lord.Runc:i.man; The meeting ended with Chamberlain 
promising to use his influenc~ on.his goverrment and on the French., 
Hitler promising not to intervene in Czechoslovakia before nego-
tiations were reswned unless an "impossible si tuation11 a.rose, 
and both agreeing to meet again in a few days. 
The French were generally pl~ased with Chamberlain's initia-
tive in going to Berchtesgaden, although Daladier was piqued at 
being left out., and some leaders, such as Edouard Herriot and Paul 
Reynaud., feared that the meeting might·unduly increase Hitler's 
prestige. Daladier, being treated very shabbily by Chamberlain, 
was anxious to discuss the Berchtesgaden meeting and., when no 
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communication from the British arrived by September 17, he conveyed 
his interest to Phipps. The Prime Mini$ter promptly rectified his 
neglect of the French by inviting Daladier and Bonnet to come to 
London immediately for discussion; and the invitation was·instant-
' 
ly accepted. 
Bonnet; meanwhile, had been busily engaged in compromising 
the.French position. 'Ihe Foreign Minister was very likely aware 
of the frantic messages to London from Herrlerson·in Berlin to the 
effect that no solution was possible unless the French and British 
immediately accepted the principle of self-determination. Ever 
since the fourteenth of September; Bonnet, looking for a peaceful 
settlement above all else, had repeatedly told Phipps that, although 
the French government would prefer to see an autonomous Sudeten-
land within a federal Czechoslovakia, they would, in the last re-
sort and to avoid German aggression, accept any solution, including 
plebiscite in the Sudeten area, and impose that settlement on 
the Czechs. 5 Bonnet also told the American Ambassador that "the ~· . . 
Czechs were not playing straight with the French and ••• th~ French 
would be fully justified in washing their hands of their obligation 
to the Czechs. 116 The French Foreign Minister was saying exactly 
what Hitler and the British wanted to hear, but his statements were 
a direct contradiction of Daladier's policy. 
The French Premier was prepared to take a much firmer stand 
against Germany, but his determination to protect Czechoslovakia 
was weakened by two events which immediately preceded his trip to. 
London. First, Da;l.adier received word on September 17 that the 
Czechs were willing to cede part of Bohemia to Germany. This 
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message came from Jaromir Ne~a~, a Socialist member of the Czech 
cabinet,; who told Leon Blum on behalf of Benes that since the Czechs 
were expecting Great Britain and France to demand concessions, they 
were sending a map with military works am fortificatiops clearly 
marked .so they would kn,ow the furthest boumary of what could be 
ceded without destroying Czechoslovakia. Wh~n Daladier received 
the map and the message from one of Blum's associates, he got the 
impression that it was an actug.l proposal for cession from the 
Czechoslovak government. 7 He later told a commission investigating 
events in France from 1933 to 1945 that he was embarrassed by the 
propositior, but it was in.line with what Chamberlain was asking 
for and circurrwented the plebiscite which was dangerous to Czecho-
slovakia because the country's other minorities might demand the 
same privilege. 8 Thus the idea of cession, which Daladier had 
previously invoked only reluctantly because of Czech opposition, 
now became a viable policy. Although the Czechs later claimed that 
the message was misunderstood:j its :impact on Daladier's thinking 
is unmistakable. The Czech map enabled Daladier to plead for 
cession in London because he thought the Czechoslovak government 
approved that policy. 
The second.discouraging incident before the. September 18. 
conversations was a report from the French High Corrmand, Daladier 
had asked General Gamelin what France could do alone to help Czecho-
slovakia in.case of German aggression. After consulting his staff, 
Gamelin replied that ·"Germany could destroy Czechoslovakia in a 
few days and that a French.offensive could not be mounted in less I 
than. fifteen days and even then it would not . be a frontal 
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offensive."9 In other words, without help, France could not hope 
to save Czechoslovakia. 
In spite of these discouragements, Daladier still took a fairly 
strong stand in favor of the Czechs at the London talks and produced 
a significant change in British policy. The· French an:i British 
leaders met at eleven o'clock on the moring of September 18, for 
the first tirrB since Apri1. 10 Chamberlain opened the, discussions 
with an acqount of the Berchtesgaden meeting and explained that 
he .now realized the situatipn was much more urgent am critical 
than he had thought. The· vital question, as he saw it; was whether 
Great Britain and France should resume negotiations with Hitler on 
the basi~ of self-determination for the Sudeten Germans or whether 
11 
they should expect war. In the ensuing discussion it became 
clear that the British wanted to know the French position on the. 
principle of self-determination, the French wanted to know the 
British position, and. neither would speak first. 
By way of introduction, Chamberlain explained Lord Runciman 1s 
view that Benei and the Czechs were to Qlame for being "dilatory" 
and that the "only possible solution which .remained.was some scheme 
based on1 acceptance of the principle of self-Eletermination, 1112 
The Prime Minister tried to place the onus of acceptance on the 
French by pointing out that their treaty obligations put them in a 
different posi:tion than the British. It was therefore the French 
responsibility to·say whether or not self-determination should be 
accepted. 
After failing several times to obtain a British opinion on the 
question, Daladier finally began to express his reservations about 
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acceptance. In doing so, he demonstrated a much clearer understand'-
ing than Chamberlain of Hitler'.s nature and objectives. First, he 
observed that the majority of German generals were in favor of 
peace, but_ "the Fuehrer lived in an atmosphere of exhaltation and 
excitement, which was particularly noticeable in his immediate 
entourage. 1113 The French Premier also brought up German duplicity 
by reminding Chamberlain that Field IVJarshall Goering had-recently 
told Halifax that "he did not think of annexing Sudeten.territory, 11 
but-now that was .exactly what the Germans were contemplating, "and 
probably had many other objects in view as well. 1114 
Then Dalad;i.er turned to the question of plebiscite, which 
was the heart of the question of self-determination. He saw that, 
because of the German minorities throughout Central Europe, the 
plebiscite would become a weapon to "keep Central Europe in a. 
constant state of alarm and suspense" which would only favor 
"ultimate German aims. 1115 If the principle of self-determination • 
were applied in Czechoslovakia, the state would be destroyed. Th.e 
Poles, the Magyars and even the Slovaks would demand equal treatment; 
then Germany would march on to Romania, which already had a Nazi 
Fuehrer in Transylvania; and then would come Poland. If, the prin-
ciple of self-determination were adopted, "Instead of establishing 
peace in Czechosl()vakia, we should have_ only opened the door to 
further conflicts and eventually to a European war. 1116 
Chamberlain argued in return that Hitler did not see.the 
principle of self-determination as a weapon to destroy Czechoslo-
vakia. He was interested only in the Sudeten question and not in 
a broad application of that principle. Daladier reinterated that 
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Hitler's objective was the destruction of Czechoslovakia and a 
German "March to the East." "Within one year we might expect her 
to turn back against France and Great Br>itain, who would then have 
to meet her in rnuchmoredifficult circumstances that those exist-
ing to-day. 1117 These were prophetic words which, no doubt, returned 
to haunt paladier at Munich. 
When Chamberlain again avoided Daladier's request for a state-
ment of the British position, Lord Halifax finally spoke up by 
saying that the Br'itish government first wanted.to consult the 
French, who were much more directly concerned because of their 
treaty obligations. He wanted to know if the French could "reconcile 
their Treaty obJ,igations with the fulfilJment of the ·.condition 
whi:ch .•. was essential to erablE:! him to continue the negotiations. 1118 
The Foreign Secretary pointed out the hard·facts that French and 
Russian aid to Czechoslovakia would be difficult to accomplish 
and that Hitler had made it. clear that the only wav to continue 
negotiations was on the bapis of self-deterrniration. 
The Prime Minister then troke in to suggest the.meeting adjourn 
for lunch so the French delagation could 4iscuss the matter among 
themselves. But first he emphasized that negotiaitons could pro-
cede only on the basis on considering ways and means of putting the 
principle of self-deterrniration into effect. If there w~re no 
further negotiations, there would be war. Chamberlain then added a 
not-too-subtle hint that, in light of the French treaty obligations, 
it was the right of the French government to advise the Czechoslo-
vak gov~rnment how to act in certain circumstances s0 as to bring . 
those obligations into effect. The Prime Minister wanted to make 
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it clear the British "did not wish to separate (themselves) fran 
the French government or leave the French governmentalone. 1119 
He said the British government would associate themselves with 
"certain advice" if the French felt they could give it to the Czecho-
slovak government. Thus, while Daladier was seeking British aid 
in opposing Hitler, the British were offering support against 
Czechoslovakia. 
However, Daladier left the door to compromise open a crack by. 
explaining that his purpose in London was to find a way to prevent 
"France fran being forced into war as a result of her obligations 
and at the pame time to preserve Czechoslovakia .an:i save as much 
of that country as was humanly possible" implying .that he was 
,desperately searching for some mean between appeasement and war. 20 
When the conference readjourned following lunch, Dalad.ier 
corrmented that the French objections to.the use of a plebiscite 
retained their full.force. "It would be almost impossible for the 
French Government to accept any formula on this basis. 1121 However, 
Daladier then presented an alternative plan on a carefully drawn, 
an:i possibly artificial, distinction. While ·maintaining 
his rejection of self-determination and the use of a plebiscite, 
the French Premier, without mentioning his recent message from the 
Czechs, argued that the Czechoslovak government might be persuaded 
to accept outright cession of. the territory to Germany. There 
were to be two guarantees to Czechoslovakia. First, the valuable 
Czech fortifications in the Sudeten area would not be ceded to 
Germany, and, second, there would be an international guarantee.of 
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the ,czechoslov~ state. Furth:ermore, the agreement was conditional· 
up0n prior-0onsultation with the Czechs. 
Daladier,' s distinctien may. be a bit d:Lfficult to understand, 
for his plan at first glance seems to achieve the same goal as 
Hitler.' s Ji)rinciple . ~f self-determination, except that there is 'no 
uncertainty inv0lved as with ·the plebiscite. , However, hi$ object. 
was-te aveid giving other minorities in_Czeohoslovakia a basis.for 
( 
d~ma.niing .their ewn independence. Thi,s meant that he could net 
• 
suppert self-detern4na,tion _or a plebi~cite which would be based on 
that principle.. Evident!:)1,-·he; assUII1ed · that other excus,es could be 
m;de for 0utright cession of thei territory to _Hi tl~, thus· , :"1"'. L • .. 
ing the issue of self-determination. Believing that the Czechs . 
were now willing to consider cession of parts of the Sudetenland 
to Gerrrlf3.rly, Daladier's main concern was .that the remair:rlng Czecho-
slovak sta~e be protected from her voracious neighbors. Daladier 's 
plan therefore would solve the Sudeten question by giving the 
territory to Hitler, while_ at the same time, preserving and guaran-
teeing the.intergrity of the .Czechoslovak state. 
An _alternative interpretation, les_s flattering to the. French 
~mier, would. be that Daladier had abandoned his support for the 
Czechs, but was trying to keep that fact from being obvious py, 
dr~wing an artifici/:l,l distinction between the ideas of plebiscite 
and. cession. In. light of the message which led Daladier to believe 
that the Czechs .would accept cession and-considering his later 
support for the Czechs, this latter position does not seem to be 
too credible. However, it shO'l;Lld be noted that one of Chamberlain's, 
first statements to Hitler at Godesberg was that the.French-and 
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the Czechs had accepted the principle of self-determination. The 
British account of the .Anglo-French conference does not uphold that 
statement. No such. declaration was made at the London meeting, and 
the Czechs obviously would pever agree to that principle since it 
would mean the distintegration of their state . Daladier meant to 
~aw a definite and valid distinction between self-determination. 
and cession, but either this distinction escaped Chamberlaip~r 
the Prime Minister lied to Hitler. 
In any event, the British quickly adopted the idea of cession 
and the discussion moved· to a consideration of the problems in-
volved with that approach. Chamberlain felt that the Czechs 
should pe warned t~at territorial cessions would generally involve 
those areas in which Sudeten Germans were a majority of the popula-
tion. Daladier, supported by Bonnet,. argued that the frontier 
should be as ethnically correct as possible, but it ~hould be 
adjusted by ari international conmission to take into consideration 
the defense and security of the Czechoslovak state. While no 
consensus was reached on the specifics of·that point, both parties 
agreed that an international commission should be entrusted with 
final delinut~tion of the German-Czechoslovak frontier an:1 that 
problems of transfer of population should be allowed for. 
Discord erupted, however, over the question of the internation-
al guarantee of Czechoslov:akia' s new boundaries. The French dele-
gates insisted on the guarantee, similar to that given Beligum and 
Switzerland, in order to forestall Hitler's eastward expansion. 
But the British refused to make any corrrrnitment involving more than 
, . 
diplomatic .support for the Czechs, offering the excuse :that they 
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spoke also for the Dcminions and could not corrrrnit them to military 
action. Daladier explained that Hitler's objectives, as set forth 
in Mein Kampf, were quite clear, and that a ~antee of Czecho-
slovakia's strategic position was necessary to prevent German dom-
ination of Europe. Finally at five o'clock, Charnt>erlain asked 
for a recess in order that the British Cabinet might consider the 
question of the guarantee. 
In the course of the recess, British diplomatic leadership in 
the matter was reasserted. A draft joint message to the Czecho-
slovak government was drawn up by the, British and both parties 
considered it over dinner . Daladier, too tired to argue further, 
reluctantly agreed to everything of substpI1ce in the telegram 
"in the interests of European peace," and returned to Paris. 22 
I 
The substance of the Anglo-French proposals was that Czecho-
slovakia was to cede to Germany approximately those areas with at 
least fi~y per cent Sudeten German population, with an interna-
tional corrmission set up, with a Czech member, to adjust the final 
boundary. In return, Great Britain agreed to join in an interna-
tional guarantee of the new Czechoslovak frontiers if such a general 
guarantee.against unprovoked aggression replaced the present 
treaties involving reciprocal military obligations. 
In spite of the condemnation of Daladier by later writers such 
as Hubert Ripka for agreeing to the cession of Czech. territory 
which would. leave the country defenseless, the French Premier had 
actually done his best. to preserve Czechoslovak security while at 
the same time ::settling the Sudeten problem. 23 Daladier' s intran-
sigence had produced a profound change in British policy, The idea 
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of a plebiscite to determine the future of the Sudetenland on the 
basis of self-determination originally considered essential by 
Chamberlain, was rejected and replaced by the cession of territory 
under international control. While no rrention of.Czech fortific.a-
tions was ma.de in the final proposals, the British did agree, at 
French insistence, to an international c6rmnitment far beyond what 
they wanted to accept. The proposals as a whole, howeve~, based 
I'·, 
on the conciliatory positions of France and Great Britain and on 
their !Tilltual hesitation to act without the support of the other, 
represented a substantial concession to Hitler, Daladier had 
managed to reduce the seriousness of the concession and had endeav-
ered to guarantee Czech security, but the essential concession-...,.the 
transfer of territory to the Reich--had been made and the weakness 
' of Anglo-French diplomacy established; 
The French had .extra.cted one further concession from the 
British: the Czechoslovak government was to agree to any proposals 
submitted to Hitler. Therefore before Chamberlain could meet again 
with the Fuehrer, the Czechs would have to accept the cession of 
the Sudetenland to Germany. The Prime Minister had compromised 
a great deal, but since the Anglo-French proposals achieved the 
desired end of handing the.Sudetenland to Germany, Chamberlain 
assumed·that the pr0posals would be acceptable to the Fuehrer. 
Thi.s program, as Chamberlain saw it, was the only road to peace, 
and that road could not be jeopardized by Czech rejection. Conse-:-
quently, the next few days saw intense diplomatic pressure to 
force the Czechs to accept the Anglo-French proposals. British 
initiative clearly dominated this pressure, but Bonnet eagerly agreed· 
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to every British action. Daladier's role in this episode is not 
entirely clear. He apparently ramained rather passive and allowed 
Bonnet and the British to extract the Czech agreement which he had 
expected would be forthcoming. 
The Anglo-French proposals were presented to President Bene~ 
in . Prague at two o'clock on September 19 by Vict,or-Leopold de 
Lacroix and Sir Basil Newton, the French and British ambassadors, 
respec;:tively. The Czech leader was bitter and very disturbed, but. 
Newt,on noted that he would probably accept the proposals and was 
receptive .to any reason which would help him justify accep;tance 
24 to the Czech people. 
Meanwhile, in Paris the French cabinet met and unanimously 
approved the Premier's actions in London. Those in the cabinet 
who favored·appeasement, led by Bonnet, brought up the consider-
ation that if Czechoslovakia rejected ·. the proposals France .should 
consider herself released from her treaty obligations. But Daladier 
was not yet ready to go that far, and the suggestion was tabled. 
Eve.nts, however, were soon to change that decision. For the British 
Ambassador in Prague had misjudged the Czech temperament; On the 
evening of September 20, the Czechoslovakian government, in spite 
of strong diplomatic pressure, rejected the Anglo-French proposals, 
insisting instead that the Sudeten dispute be settled by application 
of the Gerrnan-:-Czechoslovak Treaty of Arbitration of·l925. 
The· Czech rejection appeared conclusive, but while Lacroix was 
sending Paris his version of the Czech action, he received a call 
from Dr. Milan Hodja, the Czechoslovak ·Prime Minister. Hodja was. 
convinced that the French were preparing to abandon Czechoslovakia 
77 
and.favored acceptance of the Anglo-French proposals. He .told. 
Lacroix that a French note confirming that France would not fight 
v for Czechoslovakia would force Benes to accept the proposals and 
was the only way to. save peace. Lacroix thereupon wired Paris that 
the.Czechoslovak government had requested a "cover note" to justify 
acceptance of the Anglo~French proposals. 25 Altho~gh Lacroix 
apparently believed th~ note was requested only in case the French 
government had already decided not to honor her commitment to 
Czechoslovakia, the message was not interpreted that way in Paris. 26 
Bonnet, Daladi.er and two other Foreign Office officials accordingly 
dra~ed a message which .contradicted. the cabinet's position of 
the previous.day and provided the Czechoslovak government with an 
excuse to accept the Anglo-French proposals: 
France, in accord with England; has set forth the 
only procedure which it judges in the actual circumstances 
can prevent the Germans from marching into Czechoslovakia. 
In rejecting the Franco-British proposal the Czech 
government assumes the responsibility for Germany resort-
ing to force. It thus ruptures the Frencn-British soli-
darity which had just bee.n established and by doing so 
it removes aIT;J practical effectiveness of assistance 
from France .... 
dze.choslovakia · thus assumes the risk which we believed · 
to have been removed. She must herself un:lerstand the 
co:t1clusions which France has the right to draw if the 
Czechoslovak government does not accept imnediately the 
Franco-British proposa1.27. 
In French eyes, the message was a mere response to a Czechoslovak 
request, but to the Czechs who had hoped to resist Hitler, it was 
a betrayal. 
'Ihe British had prepared a note similar to the French cover 
note,.and at 2 a.m. in Prague the two ambassadors presented the 
v 




Benes was totally demoralized now and had no choice but 
to give in,. On September. 21, the Czechoslovak government announced 
acceptance of the Anglo-French proposals: 
Under pressure of urgent insistence ·cuJ.mina,ting in Britis_h 
commu.nd:.cations of September 21 Czechoslovak Government 
sadly accept French and British proposals on supposition 
that the.two Goverrinents will do everything in carrying 
them o~~ to safeguard vital interests of Czechoslovak 
state. 
The offical Czech communique to the people explained it quite 
simply: "We ha4 no other choice tiecause we were left alone." 
v Privately, Benes was not · ~o tactful. "We have been, basely · 
'Y) 'J9 
b t . ,;;, .. 'rl~ ll"r · 1;..~ de 1 d e ,r"'>)'e.'-1<'.j , ,;·:;=L' c are • 
r:Ihe· conces~ions extracted from Czechoslovakia on September 21 
were actually a greater capitulation to.Hitler than the Munich 
Conference itself. Once-the Czechs had accepted.the idea of 
cession of the Sudetenlam. to Germany, the negotiation~ which 
culminated in the Munich Agreement were simply a matter cir how 
much, how fast 8J'.ld under what conditions. Th~ only remaining 
qu~stion was whether or not what remained of Czechoslovakia would 
be a viable state. 
'.Ihe· policy whic_h: led the Western democracies to this stage 
was inspired principally by ·the British.3° .Although many of the 
details of Anglo-French pressure on Czechoslovakia have been omitted 
here, only a few examples are necessary to show the degree to 
which. French dip1ornacy: was under British domimtion. On September 
21, for instance; Bonnet wired Halifax that GerrI¥ll1Y had concentrated 
five mere divisions against Czechoslovakia and told him that the 
French government was contemplating putting another seven divisions 
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behind the Maginot Line so that Hitler would know that the French 
were ready to act if Germany launched an invasion of Czechoslovakia. 
But. first, Bonnet wanted to get the British opinion on whether or 
not this action would interfere with.the upcoming negotiations 
at Gcxiesberg. 31 Halifax replied that his Majesty's Gwernment could 
not presurre to offer advice but "would see no objection" to such 
an action. 32 Thus, while the British were acting independently at, 
Gcxiesberg, Bonnet was seeking British advice in the guidance of 
French policy. 
Th.e British took a further initiative on September 22 when.the 
Sudeten "Freikorps," organized in Germany by Konrad Henlein, 
crossed the frontier and occupied .the district of Asch. In.view 
of the increasing German rnili,tary thr~at, Halifax suggested to 
Alexis Leger, Secretary-General·of the French Foreign Office, that 
the British and French, should withdraw their advice to Prague, in 
effect since September 18, not to mobilize. Leger agt>eed, but before 
the action was offically taken, word lwas received from the Prime 
Minister at Godesberg that all parties should refrain from actions 
which might interfere with the progress of the conversations.34 
The order was consequently rescinded, and it was not until the 
afternoon of·September 23, at Daladier's request, that the Czech 
government was told that the "French and British Gove.rnments cannot· 
continue to take responsibility of advising them .not to mobilize. n) 35 
No longer constringed the Czech mobilization began at 10:30 p.m. 
Only a few days earlier in Londpn, Chamberlain had insisted that 
the French make the decision regarding self-determination because 
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they were more directly concerned about the fate of Czechoslovakia. 
Now the British were openly directing French policy regarding the 
Czechs. 
The development which led to the rescinding of the Anglo-French 
advice to the Czechs not to mobilize was the unfavorable course of 
Chamberlain's meeting with the Fuehrer at Godesberg. 36 The Prime 
Minister flew to Gcp.esberg on September 22 to resume his role as 
mediator, again without a French or Czech representative. He 
informed Hitler of the Anglo-French proposals of territorial cession 
and an international guarantee of the new Czechoslovak frontier. 
If Hitler was surprised that the British and French had wrung such 
far-reaching'concessions from the.Czechs, he did not show it. 'llie 
Fuehrer calmly replied that those proposals would no longer suffice. 
'llie. reign of terror by Czech officials an:l the.lawless disorder 
that pervaded the Sudetenland necessitated irrmediate evacuation of 
the area by the Czechs and occupation] by the German army. Neglect..;. 
ing the fact that the reign of terror was manufactured by German 
propagandists and that the riots were incited by Nazi agit;ition, 
Hitler demanded that a frontier be drawn at once with no interna-
tional commission. Realizing that the Western powers would not 
oppose him, Hi.tler had decided to maintain his objective of destroy-
ing Czechoslovakia by mill tary ac.tion and would not accept a . peaceful 
solution. 37 
'llie Fuehrer said the German army would occupy the Sudetenland 
immediately to restore law and order, and then plebiscites would be 
arranged so that the people mp.ght decide whether or not to remain 
within the Reich. Any, area not wishing to remain would be returned· , 
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to Czechoslovakia. Hitler added the implicit threat that if a 
peaceful settlement with ethnic.frontiers could not be reached 
qui.ckly, he would be forced to resort to a military solution which 
would result in a "strategic frontier. ,i3S 
Chamberlain was stunned;. He questioned Hitler, but challenged 
him only on the basis that the plan was analogous to the seizure 
of conquered territory in .the eyes of the public. Eventually the 
Prime Minister agreed to adjourn until the next day. That evening 
Chamberlain wrote Hitler a letter statlng that he would transmit 
the new Gerrnanpr0posals to the Czechoslovak government but also 
pointing out the difficulties involved. The Fuehrer's reply 
maintained his demands. 
When the two leaders met again on the evening of September 23, 
Hit.ler handed Chamberlain a map and a memorandum. setting forth his 
demands . The map showed areas colored red which were to be · 
evacuated between September 26 and 28 and occupied by German troops 
immediately. In addition there were areas within what remained 
of Czechoslovakia colored green which were also to.be subject to a· 
plebiscite. Finally, there was to be no destruction of property, 
foodstuffs or equipffii:;nt by the with~awing Czechs. 
Chamberlain said·h!e would convey the. proposals to the Czechs, 
but he made it clear what the outcorre would be.. nHe would go home 
with a heavy heart ... But his conscience was clear; he had done 
everything possible for peace. Unf'.ortunately he had not found an 
echo in Herr Hitler. 1139 With this.display.of·apparent·resignation to 
war, Hitler becarre somewhat more conciliatory. He accepted minor 
changes in the wording to make the memorandum less abusive and 
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added the option of an international boundary conmission. The 
Fuehrer also agr>eed to substitute his timetable with a single date 
of October 1, th~ very date he had set in May for the destruction 
of Czechoslovakia. Having obtained these minor concessions, 
Chamberlain returned to London. 
'Ihere were many·people in London and Paris who thought that 
the Godesberg proposals were substantially the same as the Anglo-
French plan, except that the territorial exchange was to be more 
immediate. There were, however, fundamental principles involved 
which brought Europe to the brink of war. Hi t·ler had cast aside all 
guarantees of the political, military and economic viability of 
the new Czechoslovak state upon which Daladier had insisted in 
London. The plebiscites which Hitler denanded raised the question of 
se·1tec,.e:ternrl.natidln and, in the course of his remarks, the Fuehrer 
had pressed the cla:ilns of all minorities, not just the Sud.et.ens 
as at Berchtesgaden. The. territory demanded by Hitler was signifi-
cantly larger than that agreed to in the Anglo-French proposals, 
and there was no possibility that Czechoslovakia might retain her 
high-quality fortifications. They were to be handed over to 
Germany at once and intact. Finally the green areas in which Hitler 
demanded additional plebiscites were very strategic in:iustr;ial am 
agricultural centers in.Bohemia and Moravia. To deprive Czecho-
slovakia of these areas would cut the state in half and strangil.e 
it economica;t.ly. The Anglo-French proposals at least left a 
poss;ibility .of survival for Czechoslovakia. The Godesberg memo-
randum ·was designed · to destroy the state. 
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The Czech reaction to the Godesberg proposals was quick and 
categorical. On September 25, the day after Chamberlain returned 
to London, the Czechoslovak Ambassador to Great.Britain, Jan 
Masaryk, told Halifax, "Herr Hitl~r's demams in their present form 
are absolutely and unconditionally unacceptable to my Government." 
He promised, "utmo.st resistance" and swore that "the nation of 
St. Wenceslas, John Hus anp. Thomas Masaryk will not be a nation of 
slaves. 1140 
When Hitler's demands became known, pu'qlic opinion in France, 
which had been ardently . opposed to war, underwent a startling 
reversal. There was no enthusiasm for war, but there was a growing 
conviction that it would be necessary to curb Nazi. expansion. 
French. mobilization was speeded up, and within forty-eight hours, 
fourteen di visions were sent to the Maginot Line . It was in this 
atmosphere that the French leaders were swmnoned to London on 
the evening of September 25 to discuss the Fuehrer's latest 
proposals, 
Chamberlain opened the meeting at 9:25 p.m. with an account 
of the Godesberg meeting. 41 Daladier irrnnediately attacked the 
memorandum on the grounds already given, but Chamberlain tend.ed 
to be conciliatory. He noted that the memorandum did not call for 
occupation by force, but rather for military Dccupation by agree-1 
merit to maintain law and order. Furthermore, the occupation was 
not final, but was subject to a plebiscite to be carried out under 
international control. Daladier insisted, as his Council of 
Ministers had agreed that morning, that acceptance of the Godesberg 
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memorandum would constitute the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia 
and the domination of Europe by Gerrrany. 
But Chamberlain doubted both French determination to aid Czecho-
slovakia ancfl. her military capability to do so. When the Prime 
Minister asked what France proposed to do, Dal.adier 's only answer · · 
was "Our next. step 'Should be to say to .Herr Hitler that he should 
return to the.Anglo-French proposal agreed upon last Sunday. 1142 
To the question of what should be cl.one if Hitler refused, the French 
Premier replied evasively, "In that case each of us( should have 
to do his duty. 1143 He had not furth~r proposal to make .. 
The· British ,were not content with this. They wanted to know 
what France would do if Czechoslovakia rejected the memorandum 
and Hitler invaded the country. Dalad.1ler replied hesitantly an:i 
with reluctance that France would honor her treaty obligations to 
Czechoslovakia. It is not difficult to imagine what was going 
through Daladier' s m;ind. Having fought :in the Great War and sane 
of its bloodiest batt.les, it was very difficult to speak the wc0rds 
which would corrmit Europe to a repetition of. that horror, But 
that was precisely the task facing the.French Premier. 
In response to specific questions, Daladier finally admitted 
that land and air operations would be attempted against Germany. 
The· British, for their part, were skeptical of French military pre-
paredness. At last Daladier expla;tned what was on his min:i. He 
said he wished to speculate more on the moral obligations of France 
than on war .. and strategy. The following, in the indirec.t quotation 
of the British Foreign Office .is the French Premier's statement: 
It should be remembered that.only a week. ago he (Daladier) 
had agreed; without consulting the other members of his 
Government , to dl.ismember a friemly country boum to France 
not only · by ,treaties bµt by ties centurles old. This. was 
France's sacrifice to the peace of Europe. - Li~e a bqFbar-
ian M. Daladler had been ready to cut up thls country with.-
out even cousulting her and handing over 3 1/2 million of· 
her population to Herr Hitler.· It .had not been a very 
agreeable task for him. It had been hard, perhaps a little 
dishonoring; but he had felt this was better1''than to begin 
again what we had seen 20 yea.rs ago. He _had been there, 
although he would not stress this point. But it was a 
different· thing to giv.e Herr_Hitler the possibility of say-
ing to .his people that, without firing a shot,.Gre~t 
Britain and.France·had handed over tohlm 3 1/2 million 
men. This would not suffice for hlm. M. Daladier asked· 
at what point we would be prepared to stop and how far 
we would go. Li~e the British Ministers, M. Daladier was 
seeking peace, a.r.d if means could be found by which Herr 
Hitler could take over these areas which the French Govern-
ment had agreed to abandon to her (sic) , even if this 
involved adding to French sacrifices, he would agree. The 
Czechs.were, however, hwnan beings. They had·their country 
and had · fought at our side. We must as.k what they thought 
of all this. Perhaps formulae of conciliation might be 
found, although he feared that all conciliation was only 
preparing for the destruction of Western civilization and of 
liberty in the world, If, however, it was possible to make 
fresh concessions, then they should be studied with the 
Czechoslovak Government. There was one concession, however, 
he would never make,. and that . was that marked on the map 
(Note in the original: M. Dal_adier was referring to the 
proposed arrangements in Moravia), which had for its object 
the destruction of a country and Herr Hitler's domination 
of the wor~d and of all that we val~~ most. France would 
never accept that, come what might. 
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Daladier then put forth a proposal of his own. He suggested main-
taining the Anglo~French proposals but adding a time lirniit of a 
week or-ten days to the time given the international commission to 
set the final boundary for German opcupation. This he hoped, 
would overcome Hitler's objection that haste was nec~ssary. This 
suggestion was followed by a period of questioning when both parties 
tried to get more specific information from each other and neither 
would give it. 
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The French Premier finally said that he did not wish. to enter 
too far into technical discussions and put three specific questions 
to the British ministers: (1) Did they accept Hitler's plan? 
(2) Were th~y thinking of pressuring the Czechoslovak Government 
to accept, knowing that the Czechs would rather die than accept? 
(3) Did they think France should do nothing? 
Chamberlain cautiously avoided all three questions. To the 
first he answered only that it was not for the British government 
to accept Hitler's proposals; to the second that thE; Czechoslovak 
government had already indicated they would refuse and Britain had 
no means to compel them to reverse their decision; and to the 
third that it was not·for the British government to express an 
opinion, but for the French government to decide. ChambE;rlain 
wanted specifics from the French in order to understand clearly the 
circumstances in which the British government would have to make 
its decision. He closed the evening meeting with a request that 
General Gamelin come to London the next day to fill in the military 
aspect of the picture. 
That informal meeting with Gamelin theJ morning of September 26 
was not encouraging. France was indeed not well prepared for war 
and her generals were unmistakabl, fainthearted. Nevertheless, 
Daladier would not yield on the French commitment to Czechoslovakia, 
and his moralistic stand had a profound effect on Chamberlain. 
"Whe_n formal. discussion resumed., the British Prime Minister announced 
that he was sending a personal messenger, Sir Horace Wilson, to 
Hitler with a letter explaining that the Czechs reaffirmed their 
acceptance of the Anglo-+French proposals but rejected the. Godesberg 
memorandurn. 45 The note also contained a final plea to avoid war 
by negotiating directly with the Czechoslovaks the peaceful annex..,. 
ation of the Sudetenland. Wilson was also intrusted with a personal 
conmunique which represented a victory for Daladier's diplomacy. 
If Hitler rejected Chartu:D.et:11a;Jttr-its offer, Wi:J,son was to explain that 
the French would uphold their treaty obligations if Germany attacked 
Czechoslovakia, and Grea:t Britain had no alternative but to .stand 
by France. This message was the strongest British statement of 
support for France, and its dispatch was a direct result of Daladier's 
determination to forcibly resist German aggression. 
Chamberlain had closely questioned French preparedness and 
appeared to favor further appeasement @f Hitler, but Daladier's 
commitment had swayed him. The Prime Minister knew that he could 
never allow French·security to be threatened, for that in turn. was 
a threat to British gecu:idty. If France, in fulfilling her treaty 
obligations to Czechoslovakia, had to attack Germany, Great Britain 
would have to be prepared to aid France. 1.t.Jhile Chamberlain was 
the acknowledged leader in dealing with Hitler, Daladier remained, 
although with some reluctance at the thought of.war, the defender 
of Czechoslovakia.· 1.t.Jhen France decided to fight for Czechoslovakia, 
Great Britain, for her own secutiry, had no choice but to follow 
the French lead .. 
The British Foreign Office reinforced its co:rnrnitment :to France 
in a public col11Il1lll:1ique issued on the afternoon of the twenty-sixth. 
which explained the French and British positions: 
The German claim to the transfer of the Sudeten areas 
has already been conceded by .the French, British and 
Czechoslovak Governments, but if in spite, of all efforts 
made by the British Prime Minister a German attack is made 
upon Czechoslovakia the irmlediate result must be that 
France will be bound to cone to her assistance, an~6Great 
Britain and Russia will certainly stand by France. 
Although Daladier was quite pleased-with the British statement, 
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Bonnet was following a policy entirely at odds with that of his 
Premier and· reacted strongly to the corrrn,unique. He first demanded 
an ex~lanation from Phipps, and then tried to suppress put;,lication 
of the sta;tement in the French press, evidently fearing that it· 
would encourage those whom he thought were trying to push France 
into a war with Germany. The FC'>reign Minister went so far as to· 
deliberat~ly spread the rumor that the British statement was a 
falsification. 47 
The British stand, on the other hand, seemed to inspire 
Daladier. William Bullitt reported that, "If Bonnet was devious 
and weak Daladier was sure of himself and strong. ,.48 D~ladier h@ 
repeated to the American Ambassador his determination to attack 
Germany if German tro~ps entered Czechoslovakia an:i commented. that 
Hitler's latest proposals were an attempt to humiliate England and 
France. But France would not give in. "To fight and die was better 
than to subrni:t·to such a humiliation. 1149 Daladier realized that 
the rej ect,ion of the Gode,sberg proposals made war a virtual certain-
ty, and his confidence in the outcome of the conflict was tempered 
by his awareness of the diff~culties which heh~ tried to conce.al 
from Chamberlain. The French Premier believed that "the war would 
be long and terrible but whatever the cost in the end France would 
win."50 Daladier's determination to defend Czechoslovkia was 
unyielding, but behind that resolution lay a great reluctance to 
commit France to repeat the horrors of 1914. 
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While the. leading French sta:tesmen were-working at cross-purposes 
in Paris, Sir Horace Wilson was. making his way to Berlin. He was 
ushered in to see Hitler and delivered the Prime Minister's letter 
at 5 p.m., only three hours before the Fuehrer was schedule:d,;to 
deliver an address at the Sportpalast. Hitler's reaction was 
violent. On hearing that the Czechs rejected the Godesberg pro-
posals, Hitler started to walk out. of the room, "and it was pnly 
with difficulty he was persuaded to listen to any more and then 
only with insane interruptions. 1151 The Fuehrer. insisted on his 
October 1 deadline and demanded that the Czechs accept the Godesberg 
memorandum by; 2 p .m. , September · 28. 
; 
Wilson, who was not a profes..L 
sional diplomat, was so shaken by Hitler's fury that he decided the 
time was not right to deliver the additional message. He arranged 
to meet with the Chancellor the next morning. 
Hitler's speech a few hours later left little room for hope. 
Screaming. insanely and insulting the Czech president personally, 
the Fuehrer demanded possession of the Sudetenland by October. 1. 
His disposition was hardly improved the next morning when Wilson 
informed him that France would faithfully fulfill her obligations 
to Czechoslovakia, and, if in so doing she should become engaged 
in hostiltiies with Ge::n;wm:Y, Great Britain would come to the aid of 
France. Hitler, insisting that he .would not invade France, inter-
preted the message to mean that if qerrnany attacked Czechoslovakia, 
France· and Great Britain would attack Germany. Wilson returned to 
London with a very pessimistic report. 
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Meanwhile ·in France, on September 26, the partial mobiliza-
tion wa~ assuming major proportions. Phipps reported to London that 
public opinion and the feelings of legislative leaders seemed to 
be resigned to the approach of conflict. 52 The next day, however, 
produced a reaction. Those who were not so resolute in the face of 
the inevitability of war began to make their presence felt. Bonnet, 
himself a major figure in the anti-war movement, took heart from 
the reaction and tried again to seek a peaceful solution. Early 
in the evening on September 27, less than twenty-four hours before 
the German ult:!.ma.tum was due to expire, the Foreign Minister sug-
gested to Phipps a vague compromise plan by which the areas of the 
Anglo-French· plan would be evacuated .by the Czechs on October 1 and 
occupied in a manner to be agreed upon.53 
. 
An international conrnis-
sion would be set up to establish a final boundary as soon as 
possible. 
The British government, however, was acting indepen:iently rather 
than waiting for French initiative. At 6:45 p.m., only ten minutes 
after Bonnet's plan was telegraphed to London, the British Foreign 
Secretary was wiring his own plan to Berlin. 54 Halifax suggested 
a token. occupation by German troops of Eger land and Asch, two dis-
tricts outside the Czech line of fortifications, on .October 1. On 
October 3, there would be a meeting .of British, Ger.man and Czech 
plenipotentiaries to arrange for the immediate withdrawal of Czech 
troops, to be replaced by a British Legion to,maintain order. The 
.Plenipotentiaries were to draw a tentative frontier to be occupied 
by German troops on October 10. Meanwhile, an international 
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boundary commission with representative~ from each of the three 
' countries was to make a final boundary decision by ·October 31, 
These two uncoordinated initiatives highlight Britain's lead-
ing role as the mediator with Germany. While .Bonnet mao.e his 
suggestion to London, Halifax made his-offer directly to Berlin 
with ne attempt at consultation with the.French. Furthermere, 
neither government sought Czechoslovak advice concerning their plans. 
Consequently, both proposals were mere anxious attempts to placate 
Hitler and avoid, war, and Bonnet was IIJE;king even more generous 
concessions than Halifax. 
However, before either of these plans could be acted upon, 
Bonnet handed over to Britain an initiative of a much more in:por-
tant nature. At 8:30 Halifax wired Phipps to tell either Bonnet 
or Daladier that, since no British ,or French action could prevent 
a sudden fait accompli with regard to Czechoslovakia,. it was in:por-
tant that subsequent action of the two governments "should be 
closely concerted."55 He asked for Anglo-French consultation and 
agreement before any offensive action was taken. Bonnet was look-
ing for a way out of committing France to war, and this request 
presented a perfect opportunity. If the British did not agre.e to 
offensive action, France would have a good excus.e for not· taking 
it. So just bef0re midnight, Phipps was able to report that Bormet 
agreed "not to take any offensive measweswithout previous con-
sultation with and agreement by us.1156 Whether or not Daladier 
would have upheld a British veto of French action is a matter of 
speculation, but from Bonnet's position, French policy was now 
effectively subordinated to an:i dependent upon British policy. 
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This agreement, however, was never tested. For the German 
Fuehrer had calmed down considerably after raving at Wilson. Hitler 
was beginning to have doubts about his "military solution" in the 
face of Western resolution. On the evening of September·27, he 
dispatched a letter to Chamberlain which was carefully calculated 
to elicit a response from the compromising Prime Minister. The 
letter included a very moderate interpretation of the German de-
mands, and Hitler gave an assurance that Czechoslovakia's political 
and economic independence would not·be interfered with.57 
Chamberlain saw the way open for a peaceful settlement and 
immediately replied to Hitler: 
A~er reading your letter I feel certain you can get 
all essentials without war and without delay. I am ready 
to corre to Berlin myself at once to discuss arrangements 
for transfer with you and representatives of France and 
Italy if you desire.58 
At the same time, the British Prime Minister wrote Mussolini inform-
ing him of his letter to Hitler and encouraging him to use his influ-
ence in urging the Furhrer to accept this final offer of negotia-
tions. And so ended the tense day of September 27. War had seemed 
inevitable that morning, but evening brought hope that peace might 
soon break out instead of war. 
The next morning, however, the French goverriment resumed it 
policy of firmness with Hitler. Fran9ois-Poncet was instructed to 
see the Fuehrer as soon as possible and impress upon him the 
seriousness of his refusal to compromise over Czechoslovakia. The. 
French Ambassador's urgent request for an interview was put off 
until late morning, but at eleven o'clock, he was finally received 
in the Reich Chancellery amid scenes of intense military activity. 
Fran~ois-Poncet presented a map with Sudeten districts already 
conceded to Germany marked in red to show the. Chancellor what he 
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could have without war. He al.so warned Hitler in strong terms what 
the result of German aggression against the Czechs would be. "If 
he believed that he could localize the conflict today, I told him, 
he was in error. If he attacked Czechoslovakia, I said, all 
Europe would be caught in the holocaust. rr59 ' 
With the expiration of the German ultimatum a little.more 
than two hours away, Frans;ois-Ponce:t's meeting with Hitler was 
interrupted by word that the Italian .Ambassador, Bernardo Attolico, 
had just prrived with an urgent message from the Duce. Mussolini 
sent word that Chamberlain had asked him to mediate in the Sudeten 
question. The Duce supported Hitler's position but urged accept-
a.nee of the British suggestion. According to Hitler's interpreter, 
Paul Schmidt, it was at this moment that the decision for peace 
was made. 60 But Fran9ois"'-Poncet reports that Hitler had not yet 
changed his mind when the meeting ended, although the Fuehrer 
was "very disturbed". about the situation. 61 Hitler next met ·with 
H~nderson who delivered Chamberlain's response to the Chancellor's 
letter. Hitler still refused a definite response, saying he wanted 
to consult Mussolini first. Then, at 2:30, Goering called Fran9ois-
Poncet totell him that Hitler had postponed his ultimatum for twenty-
four hours. The Fuehrer furthermore proposed a conference to settle 
the Sudeten problem and invited Daladier to come to Munich the next 
day for that·purpose. 
Daladier promptly accepted the invitation, although with some 
reluctance, for he seemed to know beforehand that the conference 
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would be a substantial diplomatic victory for the Fuehrer. The 
previous day the French Premier's determination had been dealt an-
other severe blow by his,pusillan:i.rnous generals. Following 
Garnelin's uninspiring performance in London, General Vuillemin again 
warned that the French air force was too weak to effectively oppose 
the Luftwaffe. His report of September 27 indicated that France 
had only seven hundred combat planes, many of limited effectiveness. 
The general estimated losses of forty per cent of initial strength 
by the end of the first month of a war with Germany and sixty-four 
per cent by the end of the second. Reserves were practically 
non-existent, and little help could be expected from the British. 
Furthermore, when French air strength was depleted, the enemy would 
be able to attack factories from the air at will, greatly reducing 
industrial production. 
The thought of German aircraft mercilessly bombing a defenseless 
France was too much for Daladier. He later told the American 
journalist and historian William Shirer that this report was 
11perhaps the chief consideration that forced him to make the cru-
cial decisions of the next ·four days . 1162 Daladier had already 
compromised a great deal by agreeing to the cession of the Sudeten-
land to Germany. Having made that concession and having obtained 
Czech agreement, it seemed senseless to go to war over relatively 
minor issues when France was so poorly prepared to meet German 
military strength. If the transfer of territory could take place 
peacefully, the French Premier was willing to sacrifice part of 
Czechoslovakia rather than face the catastrophe of another European 
war. On the other hand, if Germany refused the terms of the 
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{3hoic'e but' to asY)his Parliament to authorize a counter-offensive . 
In .search of a peaceful agr>eerent, Daladier took off from the. 
fog~shrouded Le Bourget airport at 8:45 a.m., September 29, for 
the two-and-a-half-hour flight _to Munich. A small crowd of about 
one hundred spectators joined the many o.ignitaries to cheer him 
on, but: the French Premier obviously was not looking forward to 
his Journey. Fran9pis~Poncet met Daladier ih Munich and cornrrranted · 
on 1:;he· Premier's appearance: "Broad-backed,. sunburned,. hµ.s head 
buried deep between his shoulders, his brow deeply furrowed with 
63 wrinkles, Daladierappeared gJ.oorrw and pr:-eoccupied." Driving 
through Munich to his hotel and then to the _Fuehrerhaus for the 
conference,; Daladier was genuinely astond.shed at the wai'mtp. of pis 
reception. Thousands ·of .Germans lined-the streets to cheer_ the 
statesren who had come to.Mz4ch to fashion the peace which.the 
people of Germany def:lired as ardently as those of $'ranee and Great 
Britain. Although Daladier was impressed by his cordial welcome, 
a French journalist. noted tha!t, "One felt that he was, nevertheless, 
engrossed in his thougnts, and that he had not core to Munich to 
enjoy himself, 1164 While most of the world hoped -for peace, Daladier 
anticipated 9nly defeat. 
The. French Premier arrived. at the Fuehrerhaus shortly after. 
noon and met Hitler for the first time. _Daladier thought he. looked 
"pale and te:pse. '.' As usual, Hitler's startling eyes caused corrnnent: 
His dull blue· eyes had a hard, strange look, and during the . 
short greetings ·they· suddenly_ turned upwards-~,, In London 
I had said and repeated that his aim was to set up his 
domination over Europe .. On seeing him I thought that 
I had not been mistaken.65 
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Hitler's personal charm, however, was not at its peak that day, and 
he failed to exert on ealadier and Chamberlain that nearly-
hypnotic effect which entranced so many people in the Fuehrer's 
presence. 
The first session opened at 12:45, Present were the heads of 
state and foreign ministers of France, Great Britain, Germany and 
Italy. Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union were not invited to 
the conference, an ommission bitterly resented by both countries. 
Both also chose to blame the West~rn powers for this lack of repre-
sentation rather than Hitler., who had issued the invitations. No 
attempt was made by the leaders of the democracies to secure a 
Soviet representative., because they thought such a request would 
unnecessarily delay the conference., but both Daladier and Chamber-
lain requested the presence of a Czech delegate who was waiting 
in an adjoining room. Hitler, however, refused to let the Czechs 
participate., and the two Western statesmen gave way. 
There was no formal agenda. Hitler opened the conference with 
a harsh indictment of the Czechs in which he expounded on Czech 
persecution of the Sudeten Germans and insisted that "the existence 
of Czechoslovakia in her present form is a danger for the.peace 
of Europe. 1166 Chamberlain allowed this conment to pass, but 
Daladier took up the challenge; Speaking forcefully., he posed the. 
crucial question: 
Did the Conference wish Czechoslovakia to exist or not? 
Was the proposed amputation intended to make her health-
ier and to give her better chances for life in the future? 
Or was it. but a means to weaken her, a mutilation bound 
to bring about her death? If .the point was to prepare 
the dismemberment and disappearance of Czechoslovakia, 
then he, . Daladier-, had. no business in this place. He. 
refused to be associated with such a cr.:lJne and would take 
his leave. If on the contrary; the point was to.assure 
Czechoslovakia '.s future, then he wa~ prepared to concur1 
with the otherg in a sp:;i.rit of reciprocal concession .and 
collaboration. 7 
97 
Hitler quickly apologized for expressing himself poorly and insisted 
that he wanted no Czechs in the Reich and.woul¢i not take them if 
offered, the last comrrEnt being a slip of the tongue which shows 
how obsequious the Cbancellor thought Daladier and Chamberlain 
were. 
Hitler's statement eased the tension, and Mussolini took ad-
vantage of the opportunity to present his proposals for a sett~e-
ment., whi_ch, unknown to, Daladier and Chamberlain, had been drawn 
up by the German Foreign Office and sent to the Duce just before 






Ev:acuation of the Sudetenland was to begin by Octoper 1. 
England, France and Italy would.guarantee to Germany 
that the evaucation would be completed by Octoper 10, 
wit_hout any .existing installations having been destroyed. 
T.he conditions governing the evacuation would be laid 
down in detail by an international comnittee composed 
of representatives from Germany, Italy, England, 
France and.Czechoslovakia. 
Doubtful territories. would be occupied by internatioµal 
forces until plebiscites could be held for the people to 
choose between Germany and Czechoslovakia, with the 
final determination of·· the frontiers to be carried out 
by the international committee. 
The occupation, by stages, of the predominantly German 
territory by German troops would begin on October 1.68 
The meeting then broke up into small, and increasingly chaotic, 
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groups which gathered over maps working out the details of the 
settlement. 
Daladier continu.ed to defend Czechoslovak interest, but, unfor-
tunately, not with the same determination and tenacity he had shown 
in his open:i,ng comments. According to Paul Schmidt, whose inter-
preting was constantly interrupted by dignit,aries eager to reply· 
before hearing the entire translation, Daladier sat quietly most 
of the time, except for a few occasions when he was prodded into 
action by Alexis Leger and took a fairly stiff attitude toward 
Hitler. 69 At one point, Daladier did propose that a Sudeten district 
contain:i,ng some Czech fortifications · and an important rail line . 
be exchanged for a less strategic area, but Hitler objected because 
of the purely German nature of the district. Daladier argued, 
but finally gave in and settled for a compromise that a formula con-
cerning frontier rectifications should appear in the text of ~he 
agreement. Under this formula, the areas to be transferred to 
Germany without plebiscite were also to be subject to exceptions in 
the judgment of the international commission. Daladier obviously· 
hoped that the commission would be able to preserve Czechoslovakia 
as a viable state, but was .due to be sorely disappointed. 
Chamberlain repeatedly urged Germany to. pay the Czechs compen-
satio.n for the ceded territory until Hitler lost his temper and 
shouted that he did not have. the time to waste on such trifles. 
Chamberlain was stp.rtled by Hitler's fury and dropped the subject .. 
The only other problem hindering agreeml=nt was the question of an 
intern.ational guarantee of the remaining Czechoslovak state. France 
and Great Britain pressed for the guarantee but Germany and Italy 
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hesitated .;:Jnd ma.de reservations. The two dictators finally promised 
to join the guarantee as soon as the claims of Poland and Hungary 
against the Czechs were satisfied, a proro:ise which .was of little 
value to Czechoslovakia. 
Although Daladier remained rather passive throughout most of 
the conference, he did resist some of Hitler's demands in an attempt 
to preserve Czechoslovakia. There is, however, an additional bit 
of evidence which gives the impression that · Daladier took a much 
more forceful stand than other accounts of the conference indicate. 
On October.· 3, Bullitt sent Washington an account of his lengthy 
discussion of the Munich Agreement with Daladier. 70 According to 
the American Ambassador's version, Daladier, apparently in his· 
opening remarks, announced that·certain terms of the German ultima-
tum, evidently the demands that the Czechs leave all cattle and 
/ 
foodstuff behind, were entirely unacceptable to him and he was ready 
to make war rather than accept them. When Hitler reacted with 
a violent outburst, Daladier left the room and walked up and down 
in an anteroom smoking cigarettes for an hour until Hitler appeared 
and said he would concede this point to Daladier. 
Bullitt' s account implies that Daladier walked out of the 
conference to obtain concessions from Hitler, Certainly if this 
were so, it would have been so dramatic a moment as to cause a great 
deal of comment from cootemporary observers. Since Schmidt nor 
Frangois-,-Poncet mentions the incident, it seems safe to conclude 
that Bullitt's version is somewhat exaggerated. However, it .should 
be noted that the British account of the conference; which otherwise 
scarcely mentions the French Premier, does indicate that Daladier. 
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persisted for several hours in centering the discussion on clauses. 
three and four of the Italian proposals which concerned the condi-
tions of the evacuation and the international guarantee of Czecho-
slovakia. 7l Furthermore, FranJois-Poncet 's comment, cited above., 
that Daladier said he would leave the conference if the future of 
Czechoslovakia were not assured indicates that there may be some 
grain of truth in Bullitt's story. Daladier may actually have 
excused. himself from the conference in the midst of one of Hitler's 
tirades, but. the .action clearly was not in the forro of an ultimatum 
to the Fuehrer as Bullitt implies. 
Neverth$less, the various versions of the conference do con-
! 
firm that Daladier did not meekly accept all of Hitler's demands. 
Whe.n the. agreement was finally signed in the early morning hours 
of September 30 by the four weary statesmen, the French Premier 
had done his best to preserve Czechoslovakia and had obtained two 
concessions which represented a significant departure from the 
Godesberg ultimatum. The first was the agreement that the inter-
national commission would establish the. limits of the ceded terri-
tory> giving the Czechs an opportunity to preserve their 
fortifications. Secondly> Great Britain had agreed to join in an 
international guarantee of Czechoslovakia> a step which the British 
had long resisted. Bu~ the .French Premier was clearly too dis-
heartened by the poor military and diplomatic position of France 
to press Hi tle.r too far. Whenever Hitler insisted upon a point> 
Daladier> as well as Chamberlain> gave in rather than-risk breaking 
up the conference and face the war that would inevitably result. 
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Daladier knew that the conference was an irrmense.diplcmatic 
defeat for France and Great Britain, and took no joy or relief in 
the settlement as Chamberlain· did. Fran9ois-Poncet noted that : 
We were bitterly aware of the cruelty of the· event. 
Daladier· shook his head, muttered, and cursed circum-
stances. He refused to take part in the congratulations · 
exchanged by the.other delegates.72 
Deeply depressed, Dala.dier returned to Paris, where his triumphal· 
reception was even more amazing to him than his welcome in Munich. 
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CHAPTER V 
AFTERMATH AND CONCLUSIONS 
Daladier had expected the people of France to be more conscious 
of their moral guilt in abandoning Czechoslovakia. Wh~n they cheered 
for him and wept wi.th joy because war had been avoided, Daladier could 
only accept their accolade and.caution them that peace was a tenuous 
state of European affairs . On October 4, Daladier spoke to the 
Chamber of Deputies defending the Jllb.lnich Agreement. He explained 
that the Agreement was concluded because the French goverrnnent had 
been placed in the dilemma of either saying "No" to the Sudeten 
demands, which would encourage German aggression and lead to the 
destruction of ·Czechoslovakia,. or else trying to find a compromise 
solution through negotiation. Daladier argued that the Agreement 
was beneficial because it avoided the resort to force; it was an 
improvement over the Godesberg memorandum because it mentioned the. 
right of· option for individuals and eliminated "all stipulations 
that might have appeared in an armistice imposed by the victor on 
the vanquished;" it brought the Czechs the security of an interna..,. 
tional guarantee; and, finally, it provided for an international 
commission to avoid unilate;r1al and arbitrary decisions concerning 
the cession of territory to Germa.ny. 1 
The French Premier, however, urged his countryn:ien not·to sit 
back and relax because one crisis had been resolved. He attributed 
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the success of Munich to a show of force and said he believed the 
Germans respected France because they knew she was ready to fight. 
Daladier included ,in his speech a veiled warning that, without vig-
ilance, the peace would soon be lost: 
The safeguarding of peace ought not to encourage relaxa-
tion. It must mark, on the contrary, a resurgence.of all 
French energies. I am telling you this with all the 
strength of rny conviction: if the country were to relax, 
if the maintenance of peace were for it only an excuse for 
apathy, we should--in lest time than you.may believe--
drift toward dangerous tomrn.orrows.2 . 
Daladier thus, in cauti.ous terms, expressed his distrust of Hitler 
and warned France that the. Munich peace was a fragile and uncertain 
affair. 
Privately, Daladier was able to express himself more clearly. 
The evening before his speech to the Chamber, Dala.dier spent several 
hours discussing the European situation with William Bti,llitt. 
Bullitt reported: 
Daladier sees the situation entirely, clearly, realizes 
fully that the meeting in Munich was an immense diplomatic 
defeat for France and England and recognizes that un;Less 
France can recover a united.national.spirit to confront 
the future a fatal situation will arise within the next year. 3 
In the course of their conversation, Daladier and Bullitt devoted 
an hour and a half to the state of French aviation, in:licating 
the importance of that factor to Daladier's thinking at Munich. The 
French Premier knew that France could never match German aircraft 
production and was anxious to buy the latest American planes to 
supplement his air force. He .was anticipating Hitler's continued. 
expansion and preparing for a final showdown with the Third Reich. 
Whatever hopes Daladier might have had for the viability of the 
Czechoslovakia state were dissipated in the course of the next few 
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days as the guarantees for which Daladier had fought at Munich 
were obviated by Polish and German actions. The international guar-
antee of Czechoslovakia's new frontiers never came. into effect. On 
the very day of the signing of the Munich .Agreement, Poland presented 
the Czechoslovak government with a demand for territory containing 
a predominantly Polish population. The French and British told the· 
demoralized Czechs to accept the ultimatum. H~ary, wanting to 
appear less belligerent, pres_ented -its request for a slice of Czecho,-
slovakia to the international. commission and was award,ed 4, 000 square 
miles of Slovakia in a settlement arranged by the German and Italian 
Foreign Ministers. 
The international commission itself was totally dominated by 
Germany and gave in to every German derrand. 4 The final area ceded 
Germany without plebiscite totaled 11,000 square miles and contained 
2,800,0DO Sudeten Germans and 800,000 of the Czechs Hitler did not 
want at Munich, as well. as all the fortifications which had pro-
tected Czechoslovakia from Germany. The failure of the international 
commission represented the penultimate step in a gradual series of 
concessions which .led to the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. The 
·final tragedy occurred on March 15, 1939, when Hitler used. the 
pretext of an appeal from the puppet government of Slovakia to 
swallow up what remained of the original Czechoslovakia. The Munich 
Conference was the most dramatic step, but it could not have taken 
place without the many prior concessions which had. been offered by 
the British and resisted by Daladier. The conference itself would 
not have had such drastic repercussions if the international 
commission, upon which Daladier had·insisted ·at Municn, had been 
more resistant to.Hitler's demands. 
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While these considerations tend to lessen Daladier's guilt in 
the Munich. affair, the, French Premier cannot be totqlly vindicated. 
Faced with a choice between war and peace, Daladier chose peace, 
even though it meant a tremendous sacrifice for Czechoslovakia and 
for French honor. It was not an easy decision for Daladier to 
make, and it obviously disturbed him greatly. However, considering 
B'rench diplomatic isolation and the poor condition of her military 
forces; peace, at the time, appeared to be the only logical choice. 
Daladier was convinced, rightly or wrongly, that France was not ready 
to fight Germany. For that reason, he accepted.the Munich Agreement 
in spite of his realization that it was a diplomatic tragedy for all 
of Europe. 
Critics who argue that Daladier's decision was made out of. 
weakemss fail to comprehend the intense pressures on the French 
Premier. The four yea.rs of the First World War were a deep scar on 
the French memory, and neither Dala4ier nor the rest of France were 
prepared to repeat those blocdy times. Daladier certainly did not 
anticipate the total collapse of France which occurreo. in 1940, for 
he believed that France was well protected behind the Maginot Line. 
But he did fear Germ,an air power. He realized that within a short 
time the Luftwaffe would have complete command of the air and would 
be able to raid French cities unhinde.red. Rather than face war in. 
1938, Daladier chose to put it off while he tried to unite and 
strengthen France for the coming ordeal. Winston Churchill wa.s 
certainly correct in·· asserting that the following year found France 
and Great Britain less well prepared compared to Germany than in 
1938, but this could not have been forseen by Daladier. 6 
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If Dala<iier had a weakness, however, it was not fear of war, 
for, if Germany had invaded Czechoslovakia, he was prepared to 
attac~ Germany, France had more than one million men. mobilized at 
the time of the Munich. conference, and, although Daladier could not 
himself order an attack on foreign soil, he had made ~angements 
to call parliament within twelv.e hours to request the necessary 
authorization. Daladier's weakness was to be found.more in his intel-
lectual perceptivity which enabled him to see both sides pf a ques-
tion, but_ which combined with the. lack of strong ideological 
convictions to make it diffic,ult ;for him to choose one path over. 
another, Thus he could . sympathize with the plight of the· Sudet_en 
Germans even though he realized that German propaganda exaggerated 
accounts of Czech atrocities and even though he understood Hitler's 
ultimate aims. Although Daladier chose to pursue a path of resistance 
to Hitler and stoutly defended that policy in London, his many 
doubts and his sympathy for the Sudeten Germans prevented him from 
being completely on .the side of those who advocated resistance to 
German · pressure within his divided cabinet . When this · policy of · 
defiance led him to the point of a war for which France was not pre-
pared, Daladier chose to abandon that policy, a st~p which .he took 
with great sadness and reluctance, "cursing the.circumstance$," as 
Fran~ois-Poncet put it. 
CornrrBnting on Daladier's fall from power in 1940, W. H. 
Charnberlan said, "He was an average man whose misfortune it was to 
be called on to deal with a crisis that required the combined talents 
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of a Napoleon and a Talleyrand. 117 · While Daladier was perhaps a bit 
more than the "average man" for which Chamber-lan gives him credit, 
he certainly was not a man of the genius of Napoleon. If this is 
wealmess, then Daladier was a weak man. But how many of us wou;J,d 
fare well by this standard? It seems more appropriate to say that 
Daladier, although one of the best men France had to offer, was 
not strong enough ;to conquer the·events which confronted him, Some 
historians may condemn. Daladier on the basis of their superior 
hindsight, but few statesmen at the time had the foresight to do 
better than Daladier did. 
1naladier, pp. 186-187, 
2Ibid. , p. 191. 
3FRUS, p. 712. 
FOOTNOTEp 
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Nogueres, pp. 338-340; Ripka, pp. 485-509; and Keith Eubank, 
Munich (Norman, Oklahoma, 1963), pp. 237-240. 
5Nogueres, p. 339, 
6winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, VoL I: The 
Gathering Storm . (New York, 1948), p. · 339. · - -. -
7William Henry Chamberlan, "Daladier, the Tragedy of France,n 
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